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Abstract 
A number of non-EU members – or third states – have chosen to participate in EU 
CSDP operations. This thesis seeks to answer why one of them, Iceland, has 
chosen to do so despite not being a member of the Union and not having any 
armed forces which are traditionally used in such activities. States have various 
motivations for participating in international crisis management operations and 
the same applies to the case of Iceland. The effects of the Cold War coming to an 
end and a completely transformed international arena have forced Iceland to 
adjust and seek new means to ensure its own security and interests. As Iceland is 
almost completely dependent on other actors in security terms, it has sought ways 
to secure its status within international organizations, including the EU, in order to 
address this new reality. Various other motivations can also be traced to Iceland 
participating in CSDP operations, but Iceland’s somewhat hesitant approach 
points to a state still finding its place in a changing world. 
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1 Introduction 
For an island initially settled by Nordic Vikings, ordinarily conceived as an 
antagonistic and intrusive bunch, and the setting of the blood-filled pages of the 
sagas, some might find it curious to learn that Iceland, in fact, has no army. 
Despite having no armed forces, Iceland was among the founding members of the 
intergovernmental military alliance NATO and played an important role during 
the tension-filled years of the Cold War era. With a population of only 320 
thousand people, geographical size and location and the fact that it has no army all 
contribute to Iceland being a rather special and curious case in international 
politics. While most states have an army, can mobilize a large number of people 
and are in possession of necessary technical equipment, the same does not apply 
to Iceland where an understaffed police force and groups of volunteers are mostly 
responsible for the capabilities and responding in times of danger and need. 
 
The international system has gone through a great transformation ever since 
the Cold War came to an end. These changes have had far-reaching effects on the 
manner in which states scheme their present-day security strategies, which 
international organizations they prefer to work with and other ways in which they 
conduct their foreign policy. Modern-day threats do not necessarily respect the 
borders of the versed nation state and have indirectly pushed states to put ever 
more emphasis on multilateral cooperation in order to address them. While NATO 
was forced to review its role in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the European Union (EU) has taken significant and ground-breaking steps in 
the field of security and defence, Iceland has also been compelled to react to these 
developments. This new reality has forced Iceland to rethink its position in the 
world – reassess its relations with the superpower in the west, its Nordic 
neighbors and the EU in the east, and even other major actors in the world. 
 
In recent years, the EU has increasingly been more active in the management 
of crisis situations, both within the borders of Europe and further afield. After 
establishing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999, the EU is 
now initiating its own military and civilian operations – operations it is fully in 
command of – and include police missions, border control, rule-of-law training, 
peace-monitoring and other kinds of operations. The Union recognizes that there 
are few if any of the modern-day threats it can deal with on its own. These threats 
are shared with the EU’s closest allies and international cooperation is considered 
a necessity. Objectives must be pursued both through multilateral cooperation in 
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international organizations and through partnerships with key actors (Council of 
the European Union 2003, p. 13). In line with this approach, the EU has 
welcomed third state contributions to CSDP operations and this vision of 
multilateral cooperation has been realized. 
 
Iceland is a relatively young and inexperienced player in the field of crisis 
management. Icelandʼs participation in international crisis management operations 
first came about due to pressure from NATO and as an active member in the 
international community, Iceland found itself compelled to contribute in the quest 
for a more peaceful world. The country has participated in a number of NATO 
operations since the mid-1990s. However, its contributions have understandably 
been considerably different in nature and scale when compared to the other 
NATO countries, and have mostly consisted of the deployment of ʻexpertsʼ, e.g. 
in civil aviation, instead of troops. As the EU embarked on the journey of shaping 
the CSDP and launching its first operations, Iceland was one of the non-member 
states that decided early on to contribute and has participated in two CSDP 
operations
1
 to date. 
 
Since their respective introductions, Iceland’s relationship with the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP has consistently 
been a rather delicate one, although not always openly disputed (Bailes and 
Rafnsson 2012, p. 109). Participation in multilateral crisis management
2
 
operations is by no means to be taken for granted and the reasons for participation 
naturally vary between individual states. Depending on their geopolitical agenda 
and individual strengths, non-EU states contribute to CSDP operations for a 
number of different reasons which range from security interests and the 
acquisition of operational experience to wider institutional motives (Tardy 2014, 
p. 2). The same goes for the small island state of Iceland. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 In the literature on CSDP, there is a tendency to use the term ʻoperationʼ for CSDP military operations and 
ʻmissionʼ for operations free of the military component and are purely civilian in nature. Thus, these two kinds 
of CSDP actions are often combined, especially in the field of civilian-military crisis management in which the 
EU has specialized (Kuhn 2009, p. 248). Here, the term ʻCSDP operationsʼ will generally apply to both civilian 
and military CSDP operations, unless stated otherwise. 
2
 In this thesis, the term ʻcrisis managementʼ is used as an umbrella term for a variety of activities, both military 
and civilian. The EU crisis management operations (CSDP operations) have ranged from advisory operations 
consisting of fewer than a dozen experts to big-scale peacekeeping operations involving several thousands of 
military personnel. 
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1.1 Aim and Research Question 
In most countries, the initiation of and participation in military and civilian 
operations overseas – whether they are unilateral or multilateral – is generally a 
controversial subject which is debated domestically. This applies to Iceland as 
well, a country whose citizens have a very complex relationship with foreign 
armies and warfare. Ever since 1944, when Iceland declared independence from 
Danish rule, and throughout its existence as a modern independent state, Iceland 
has refrained from establishing armed forces of its own. Instead, the country 
hosted an US military base for more than 60 years. Nations perceive the subjects 
of security and defence policies in different ways, which may result in them 
having dissimilar motives for participating in crisis management operations 
abroad. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to map Icelandic participation in CSDP operations 
and trace and seek explanations why this non-EU member state with no armed 
forces would even favor to participate in such operations. In order to do so and 
paint a more comprehensive picture, attention must also be given to Iceland’s 
reasons for participating in multilateral operations under the aegis of other 
international actors, such as NATO. As will be explained, the EU welcomes non-
member state participation and the CSDP operations are an ideal platform for 
Iceland to channel their will to contribute within the field of crisis management, 
while they echo principles and priorities held by Iceland in this policy area. The 
thesis aspires to contribute to a better understanding of why Iceland has been 
willing and chosen to contribute to CSDP operations and to integrate – although 
to a limited extent – into CSDP institutions, in spite of the country’s minimal 
access to the whole decision-making process in this field. This will be done by 
answering the research question: 
 
Why would Iceland – a non-EU member state with no armed forces – 
choose to participate in CSDP operations? 
 
By looking at the case of Iceland, this study can help us paint a broader 
picture of the EU’s military and civilian crisis management operations abroad and 
why third parties seek to hop on board and participate in implementing the EU’s 
security and defence strategies and operations. Furthermore, it adds to the 
literature on Iceland, its foreign and security policy and its links with the EU in 
general and the CSDP in particular. The fact that third parties – non-EU members, 
ranging from Russia, Norway, the US, Brazil, South Africa and so forth – 
participate in CSDP operations is interesting in itself, but the fact that a state with 
no armed forces should also choose to contribute is especially fascinating. 
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1.2 Previous Research 
As Iceland has not been very active in CSDP operations – participating only in 
two operations and also to quite a limited extent – it is not especially surprising 
that not much research has been done on the topic at hand, at least in comparison 
with some other cases. Some research has been done on Iceland and its 
relationship with the CSDP. Bailes and Þórhallsson contributed to a SIPRI 
publication in 2006 called The Nordic Countries and the European Security and 
Defence Policy with an article on “Iceland and the European Security and Defence 
Policy” where they look at Iceland and its CSDP relations. Much has changed 
since then, both with regards to the EU itself and not least Iceland, where the US 
military departed the island in 2006, the banking sector collapsed in 2008 and the 
country applied for EU membership in 2009. In 2012, Bailes and Rafnsson 
published an article on Iceland and the CSDP. That article centered around 
Iceland’s EU application and the possible relationship Iceland would have with 
the CSDP as a future full EU member state and questions about the possible 
impact of the CSDP on the nation’s non-military status which has been debated as 
part of the ongoing application. The authors look at the experience of six other 
small states in the EU which suggest that none of them has been obliged by 
membership to abandon national preferences in this field, though all have made 
special efforts to support EU police and civilian operations. Furthermore, 
Baldvinsson wrote a highly interesting chapter on the history of Iceland’s 
participation in international peacekeeping efforts and public discourse on the 
matter in a book on Icelandic foreign policy published in 2008. 
1.3 Disposition 
Following the introductory chapter – which includes the aim and research 
question of the thesis along with an overview of previous research done on and 
related to the topic – the theoretical framework of the thesis will be presented in 
chapter two. Methods and the data selected for the study will be defined in the 
third chapter, while the forth includes a historical overview of CSDP operations 
and an outline of Iceland position in the international arena – how it has reached 
both east and west in order to ensure its security and economic interests. It also 
covers Icelandic relations with international crisis management efforts in general, 
as well as Iceland-CFSP relations. The fifth chapter includes an examination of 
the empirical data and an analysis where the theoretical framework is applied to 
the case of Iceland. In the sixth and concluding chapter, the results of the analysis 
are summed up, while also looking towards the possible future developments of 
Icelandic participation in CSDP operations. 
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2 Theory 
This chapter aims to present the theoretical framework used in this thesis. The 
framework will be described in order to form a basis for the study and analysis of 
the empirical material. The application of a theory to certain circumstances or 
situations can give useful contributions to interpreting and understanding the 
chain of events. To be clear, this is only possible “if the conditions for 
applicability […] are sufficiently well understood, and if the practitioner knows 
enough history to be able to place them into context” (Keohane 1986, p. 2). This 
means that in order for the above-stated research question to be suitably answered 
and give a beneficial contribution to the field, it is both necessary to describe the 
chosen theoretical framework in an accurate manner, but also to take the historical 
context in which the events took place into consideration while analyzing the 
available data. Here, the former requirement will be addressed – that is describing 
the theoretical framework – while the latter will be addressed later on. 
 
Theoretically, this thesis will be based on Alyson Bailes’ typology which 
aims to explain statesʼ motives for sending troops to overseas missions since the 
end of the Cold War. By using theories, we facilitate the research analysis, 
produce clearer results and put them into a wider context. Bailes develops a 
typology with three headings – a similar categorization that has before been used 
in the literature to help explain statesʼ foreign policy. For example, Goldmann 
states it is both possible and useful to subdivide the matter of international 
questions, falling under the political domain, in substantive terms and distinguish 
between them (Goldmann 1986, p. 26). He draws up a typology and stresses that 
the international activities of governments are sometimes concerned neither with 
national security nor with national welfare – the two traditional international 
objectives ascribed to governments. A range of terms have been proposed to 
denote a third concern, much like in Bailesʼ typology laid out below. These terms 
include ʻmilieu goalsʼ, ʻother-regarding interestsʼ, ʻnormative interestsʼ, ʻvalue-
promotive objectivesʼ and ʻaltruistic goalsʼ among others (ibid, p. 28). In this 
case, governments are concerned with the international system as such or the 
conditions within or the relationship between countries. These matters are thought 
to be related only indirectly to one’s own national interest – by virtue of the fact 
that a better world for others is also a better world for us. Disarmament, poverty 
and a new international economic order are among the concerns falling under this 
heading. In essence, such international politics revolve around a desire to 
generally improve conditions by the application of norms thought to be 
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universally valid, instead of furthering one’s own national interests to the best of 
one’s ability (ibid, p. 28). 
2.1 A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing States’ 
Motives for Overseas Operations 
For citizens in a number of states, military action abroad – both in the proximity 
of their own territory and in more distant lands – has been an unbroken and 
everyday occurrence ever since the 15
th
 century (Bailes 2008, p. 73). Looking 
back, particularly to the 1950s and 1960s when Europeans were quite active in 
overseas operations, the motives for the actions were relatively clear and easy to 
distinguish compared to the reality of the new millennium and its complex 
dynamic. In her article, “Motives for Overseas Missions: The Good the Bad and 
the Ugly”, Bailes elaborates on these motives present during the 1950s and 60s 
under a three-fold heading: national motivations, strategic motivations and 
altruistic motivations (ibid, pp. 73-74). She points out that the formal institutional 
framework for military actions of European countries abroad was very limited in 
those days compared to today and restricted to the UN. NATO had geographical 
limitations and the EC/EU lacked military competence. Other regional 
organizations that engage in peace operations today – like the African Union (AU) 
– were either non-existent or non-operational. Organizations similar to NATO – 
such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East (and 
including the United Kingdom) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
were too short-lived to mature and develop operational traditions, even within 
their own territories (ibid, p. 74). 
Bailes furthers these motives under the same three-folded heading in her 
article and develops a modern typology of motives for overseas operations – a 
very useful and pragmatic categorization we can apply to the post-Cold War era. 
She highlights that the tripartite division still seems to hold good, while the 
“proportions have shifted and new complications have entered the picture” (ibid, 
p. 74). The different motivations are not mutually exclusive, but are related to one 
another in different ways and states can have a number of different motivations 
for contributing to operations overseas. 
2.1.1 Direct National Motivations 
Bailes lists different types of motives linked directly to national interests, while 
stressing they are not necessarily listed in order of priority (Bailes 2008, pp. 79-
80). 
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Post-colonial connections  
During the 1950s and 60s the largest deployments in terms of troop numbers were 
linked with the final stage of the European colonial empires. They took the form 
of direct protection and reinforcement of territories prior to their independence, 
emergency deployments to deal with ʻwars of independenceʼ, and post-
independence assistance, involving training and re-structuring of domestic armed 
forces. These post-colonial connections still influence European states – which 
operations to launch (e.g. Operation Serval, the ongoing French military operation 
in Mali) and who joins in on these multilateral operations. A feeling of 
responsibility towards the region in question, cultural and ethnic ties (for example 
the presence of immigrant minorities), history and formal security assurances all 
contribute to the decision-making process of the former colonial powers. 
However, now it is not as usual for the former imperial power to deploy troops 
unilaterally or go it alone. Instead, the state pushing for action encourages rapid 
multilateral intervention (like France did in Rwanda) or tries to set it up as an 
institutional intervention from the outset, preferably under the command of a non-
imperial nation. 
 
Good training and testing national forces 
States are interested in obtaining good training for and testing of national forces. 
This includes the expected gains in interoperability, and the possibility of trying 
out, advertise for sale, or to gain a stronger case for acquiring certain types of 
equipment. 
 
‘Quid pro quoʼ 
This motive circles around the notion that a contribution to an operation aims to 
please a coalition leading country, or the institution responsible. Hopes of a 
country or institution being more sympathetic and likely to intervene, should the 
given country experience national difficulties, can be a driving force and motive 
when a decision has to be made on whether or not to participate in an operation 
overseas. 
 
Territorial security concerns  
If a crisis situation has actualized in the proximity of national and regional 
borders, it may lead to migration flows, overflow of fighting/terrorist activity, 
disruption of valuable trade supplies, mistreatment of related national minorities 
and so forth. Such developments can raise grave territorial security concerns. 
These motives were strong ones for a range of European ʻfront line statesʼ 
throughout the series of actions in the Western Balkans during the 1990s and 
2000s. 
 
Groups setting up peacekeeping units as a way to regional reconciliation 
Looking at countries within and on the borders of the ʻnew Europeʼ, Bailes 
explains there have been several cases of pairs and clusters of countries setting up 
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joint peacekeeping units – and seizing opportunities to use them as a means of 
highlighting their own local reconciliation, abandonment of local antagonisms and 
territorial claims. The so-called EU Battlegroups – military units adhering to the 
CSDP – reflect such a rationale and were even preceded by voluntary groupings 
during the 1990s, e.g. Poland and Lithuania; Hungary, Italy and Slovenia etc. 
(Bailes 2008, p. 80). 
2.1.2 Strategic Motivations 
During the Cold War, strategic motivations were clearly based on the East-West 
dimension. Bailes argues that following the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of 
the Soviet Union, these motivations have taken at least three new forms. 
Actions in response to ʻnew threatsʼ 
Countries have participated in operations in response to threats from non-
state/transnational actors, in part connected to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs), which can be addressed with military means when targets can 
be geographically localized, such as in the US-led coalition actions in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Motives linked to new institutional frameworks for military intervention 
Motives of this kind are several and complex, “inasmuch as the individual state may 
be thinking not just of its own position vis-á-vis the proposed action, but of the 
action’s importance for the strategic interests and development of the institution as a 
collectivity and the impact of each choice on its own place in that community” (ibid, 
p. 81). Another type of motive, still under this heading, springs from an almost 
reversed concern, based on an assumption to remedy the institutions’ perceived 
weakness or limitations (ibid). 
 
Strategic economic motives 
These are operations which are undertaken in part, or allegedly, for economic 
reasons. The most pronounced example would be the disputed oil connection to a 
number of Western interventions in the Middle East and surrounding areas from the 
1992 Gulf War and onwards. Furthermore, it might not be too far-fetched to 
envision that continuing developments related to climate change, energy 
competition or even both in combination (e.g. following the rise in global 
temperatures and subsequent melting of Arctic ice), could lead to scenarios where a 
critical mass of European support for using military assets could be formed. This 
might for example materialize in the rescuing of victims of some natural catastrophe 
in the proximity of European borders and maintain them in camps to avert migration 
(Bailes 2008, pp. 82-83). 
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2.1.3 Altruistic Motivations 
The third heading mentioned centers around the notion of altruism, describing 
selfless and other-oriented behavior. This describes the complete opposite of self-
interest, and could therefore be considered a motivation entirely detached from 
traditional rational and realist notions. The idea that political decision-makers and 
states venture into actions that will neither benefit themselves personally nor the 
nation at large may seem to be idealistic, but the concept of altruism has still found 
its way into international relations (Krieg 2013, p. 48). Half a century ago, most 
European states were found acting under the helm of the UN in traditional 
peacekeeping operations. These operations were presented as a contribution to 
global order and humanitarian goals, and usually involved states acting in regions, in 
which they did not have any historical ties. Bailes stresses that altruistic motivations 
should, if anything, be even stronger today than in the past (Bailes 2008, p. 83). 
Advance of globalization and a more multipolar world 
An ever increasing globalized world and a world power system more multipolar 
than the bipolar reality of the Cold War, has made Europe more dependent than ever 
on “global order, restraint, lawfulness and a sense of mutual responsibility in 
security behavior, as well as on the functioning of long-range economic 
relationships and communications” (Bailes 2008, p. 83). This development can also 
be a motivation for deployments overseas. 
Popular concern and demand for humanitarian action  
European states sometimes get involved due to widespread concern among the 
public which demands humanitarian action. 
Demonstration of vigilance and strength  
Bailes asks if a seemingly altruistic action can be accompanied by a deterrent 
function – to demonstrate a state’s vigilance and strength. 
 
By applying Bailes’ typology as a tool, it can help us to identify and explain 
Iceland’s motives for contributing to CSDP operations when analyzing the empirical 
data. Even though the typology is formulated with the deployment of troops in 
mind, it can still be applied to the case of Iceland – not in possession of troops as 
such. The typology can nevertheless be used as a means to explain the motivations 
behind states choosing to send personnel to international crisis management 
operations – whether they are military or not. The thesis’ research design will be 
explained further in the next chapter. 
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3 Methodology 
While theory ideally provides clear and precise explanations of important 
phenomena, methodology generally refers to systematically structured or codified 
ways to test theories and is thus critical in facilitating the evaluation of theory and 
the evolution of research (Sprinz and Wolinsky 2012, p. 10). The methodology 
used in this thesis will be explained in the following chapter. 
3.1 Case Study Analysis 
This thesis will be an explanatory single case study of third state participation in 
CSDP operations, analyzing causal explanations and possible motives for 
Icelandic participation in these operations. This will be done by applying a 
qualitative research method – an approach to research in which the researcher 
makes knowledge claims primarily on constructivist perspectives (i.e. the multiple 
meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially and historically 
constructed with an intent of developing a theory or pattern) or 
advocacy/participatory perspectives (i.e. political, issue-oriented, collaborative or 
change oriented) (Creswell 2003, p. 18). In this kind of research the researcher 
tends to use open-ended questions and the research process is largely inductive, 
meaning that the researcher generates meaning from the data collected. In general, 
the approach aims to gather an in-depth understanding of human behavior and the 
reasons behind such behavior. The qualitative method looks into the aspects of 
why and how in the decision-making process – not simply what happened, where 
and when. As stated above, the aim of this thesis is to seek explanations of why 
Iceland has chosen to participate in CSDP operations. 
 
The aspiration is to have a theory consuming approach – characterized by 
focusing on a case and using a theory to explain it – in order to make use of the 
theoretical concepts in relation to the empirical data (Esaiasson et al. 2007, p. 42-
44). Here, the logic of conformation will be used, testing an already existing 
theory – Bailes’ typology for states’ motives for participating in missions 
overseas. The research question illustrates that this is a study where a deeper look 
is taken into one specific case – Iceland – even though single case studies usually 
draw implicit comparisons to wider groups of cases (Bennett 2012, p. 29). 
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In qualitative research, such as this one, the interpretation of data is at the very 
core although its importance is seen differently in the various approaches (Flick 
2009, p. 306). An essential feature is the use of categories, which are often 
derived from theoretical models, such as Bailes’ typology. These categories are 
brought to the empirical material and not necessarily developed from it, although 
they are repeatedly assessed against it and modified if necessary (ibid, p. 323). 
Bailes’ typology, laid out in the previous chapter, forms a sound and rather 
extensive tool for analysis. The typology will be used as a checklist of sorts, 
applying the different types of motivations for third state participation in CSDP 
operations by specifically applying them to the case of Iceland. The choice of 
method is based on the intention to get a deeper understanding of the case. The 
method gives the researcher a high level of conceptual validity or allows him to 
“identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts 
the researcher intends to measure” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 19). 
Furthermore, the case study method examines the operation of causal mechanisms 
in individual cases (ibid, p. 21). 
 
As the research question hints at, the study revolves around seeking 
explanations and motives for Icelandic participation in CSDP operations. In order 
to address the question, the method of analyzing texts will be practiced. This 
aspect of the research will be carried out by analyzing selected and relevant texts 
and documents (see chapter 3.2), that help explain the reasons or motives for 
Iceland’s contributions in CSDP operations, as well as its stance towards these 
operations in general. Document analysis, or content analysis, will make it 
possible to find if, how and to what extent Bailes’ typology for states’ motives for 
overseas operations applies to the case of Iceland. The analysis of data will also 
possibly reveal other motivations, not explicitly part of Bailes’ typology. 
Institutional and organizational documents have been a staple in qualitative 
research for many years and document analysis is the systematic procedure for 
reviewing or evaluating documents – whether they are printed or electronic 
(computer-based and Internet-transmitted). Much like other analytical methods in 
qualitative research, document analysis requires that the data is examined and 
interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical 
knowledge (Bowen 2009, p. 27). As a research method, document analysis is 
particularly applicable to qualitative case studies – studies producing rich 
descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organization, or program. The 
method has mostly served as a complement to other research methods, but has 
also been used as a stand-alone method. Indeed, there are some forms of 
qualitative research that rely solely on the analysis of documents (ibid, p. 29). 
 
In relation to other qualitative research methods, document analysis, of course, 
has both advantages and limitations. According to Bowen (2009), the method has 
the advantage of being efficient and requiring data selection, instead of data 
collection. Availability is another advantage, where many documents are in the 
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public domain, especially since the advent of the Internet, and are obtainable 
without the authors’ permission. Cost-effectiveness is also a favorable factor, as 
document analysis is less costly than other research methods and is often the 
method of choice when the collection of new data is not feasible. Documents are 
also ‘unobtrusive’ and ‘non-reactive’, meaning they are unaffected by the whole 
research process. Furthermore, they are stable, exact and can provide broad 
coverage (Bowen 2009, p. 31). However, there are also certain limitations to the 
method which will be addressed later on. 
3.2 Data Selection 
Selecting a method for a study depends on what is being studied, but first and 
foremost on the research question. According to Yin, there are six possible 
sources of evidence for case studies: documents, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin 2003, pp. 
83-96). In fact, a case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence, whether they are documents, artifacts, interviews or mere 
observations (ibid, p. 8). This research was initiated by the reading of official 
documents and other material on Iceland and the CSDP. Data was primarily 
constituted from communications, reports, speeches, national security documents 
and parliamentary discussions from around the launch of the CSDP and onwards. 
The data was mostly found from the websites of the Icelandic ministries and 
parliament as well as official EU websites. Secondary literature was then used to 
supplement the data acquired. 
 
While aware of its limitations which are described below, data for this kind of 
study can be retrieved from official documents and secondary literature, and 
therefore the method of interviews is not used. This rhymes well with Stake’s 
premise that “we try not to disturb the ordinary activity of the case, not to test, not 
even to interview, if we can get the information we want by discrete observation 
or examination of records” (Stake 1995, p. 12). 
3.3 Limitations of the Research 
When conducting a study such as this one, we must be aware of its general and 
methodological limitations. Being a small state with no armed forces, the scope of 
Iceland’s contributions in multilateral crisis management operations is very small 
compared to other states’, which results in many considering Icelandic 
participation in CSDP operations especially, a peripheral matter. This is reflected 
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in parliamentary debates on Icelandic participation in these operations which have 
been limited and official documents related to this subject are quite scarce. 
 
Concerning the theoretical typology presented chapter two, Bailes stresses that 
separating national, strategic and altruistic motives becomes increasingly difficult 
and artificial the closer one looks into national policies. This is especially 
applicable to those states that do not have overseas imperial traditions, like is the 
case with Iceland. Some states may never completely clarify the real motivations 
underlying any given decision, whether to join or leave an operation, and for 
practical and political purposes do not need to. The ‘real’ reasons may therefore 
not be presented or become accessible to the public, as politicians do not want the 
underlying motives to be seen as some form of official government policy. 
Another possibility is that some motives are ‘lighter’ and transient than any 
motive explored under Bailes’ categorization – motives that may have to do with 
personal or short-term party-political considerations for example (Bailes 2008, p. 
79). Categorization of text, based on theories like Bailes’ typology, may therefore 
obscure the view of the contents rather than facilitate analyzing the text in its 
depths and underlying meanings. With the method chosen here, the interpretation 
of the text – as in other methods – is done rather schematically, especially when 
the technique of explicative document analysis is used, but perhaps without really 
reaching the depths of the text in question. Another problem is the use of 
paraphrases, used not only to explain the basic text, but also to replace it – mainly 
in summarizing content analysis (Flick 2009, p. 328). 
 
We must also be aware of that, in general, documents are produced for some 
purpose other than research, meaning they are created independent of a research 
agenda. This can result in that they usually cannot provide sufficient detail to 
answer all research questions. One must also keep in mind that documentation is 
sometimes difficult to retrieve or not retrievable at all. Moreover, access to 
documents is sometimes deliberately blocked (Bowen 2009, p. 32). However, 
these limitations are potential flaws rather than major disadvantages. Looking at 
its efficiency and cost-effectiveness in particular, document analysis offers 
advantages that clearly outweigh the limitations. There is a need to determine not 
only the existence and accessibility of the appropriate documents but also their 
authenticity and usefulness, taking into account the original purpose of each 
document, the context in which it was produced, and the intended audience (ibid, 
p. 38). 
 
As the method of choice is analyzing texts, future research might benefit from 
interviewing Icelandic politicians – former foreign ministers especially – and 
present and former senior officials working within the Icelandic Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and the Council of Ministers or the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). This might benefit and supplement the findings and lead to 
convergence and corroboration through the use of different data sources and 
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methods. By triangulating data – combining methodologies in the study of the 
same phenomenon – we might reduce the impact of potential biases that can exist 
in a single study (Bowen 2009, p. 28). 
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4 Setting the Scene 
When analyzing the available data, the historical context in which events took 
place, must be taken into consideration. As was stated before, this must be 
rendered in order to suitably answer the research question and give a profitable 
contribution to the field (Keohane 1986, p. 2). Of course, events do not take place 
in a historical vacuum, so setting the scene for the analyzing the relevant events 
and empirical data is a beneficial step in all research. 
4.1 Development of CSDP Operations 
Aspirations of the EU becoming a global power are a somewhat unforeseen by-
product of European integration. Despite national foreign policy activities and the 
special, intergovernmental nature of the policy area, the Union’s external policy 
now extends to what can largely be described as traditional foreign and security 
policy. With American power receding and China still uncertain of its role in the 
world, the EU definitely has potential to exercise strong influence in world affairs. 
The EU’s combined GDP and foreign investments are both comparable to those of 
the US, its population is 50% larger, it has the largest total development aid 
budget in the world and it has a combined total of 28 votes in the UN General 
Assembly and two permanent seats in the UN Security Council (Thomas 2011, p. 
3). In recent years, the EU has even taken the leap of displaying a capacity for 
united military action abroad. Some scholars say that the EU has already achieved 
‘superpower status’ (ibid, p. 3) while others suggest it remains an odd global 
player, having difficulties living up to its ambitions (Peterson 2012, p. 220). 
Sceptics of foreign policy as a functional area of EU policy-making point to its 
failure to achieve a unified position on the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
recognition of Kosovo in 2008 or the Libyan no-fly zone in 2011 as evident 
indications of impassable divergences in the different member states’ foreign 
policy preferences (Thomas 2011, p. 3). Nevertheless, whichever way you look at 
the EU in the international arena, it is clear that the Union has come a long way 
from a humble birth in foreign policy and is now more globally active than ever 
before. 
 
Although the origins of the European security and defence architecture can be 
traced back to the circumstances of post-World War II, the European Political Co-
operation (EPC) is generally perceived as the foundation on which the CFSP was 
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formed. The modest aim of the EPC – introduced in 1970 – was to facilitate the 
consultation process on foreign policy among EC member states, by harmonizing 
positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions (Lindström 2012, 
p. 14). The dynamism of the newly established single market at the end of the 
1980s and the end of the Cold War generated both internal and external 
anticipation that the Community would assume a more prominent international 
role. A continuing debate on deepening integration – foremost launched in 
response to the reunification of Germany in 1990 – expanded to also involve the 
role and possible reform of the EPC. The body was considered inadequate for the 
ʻnew world orderʼ and in the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP replaced the EPC 
(Smith 2008, p. 32). The CFSP has evolved since Maastricht, but can be viewed 
as the organized, agreed foreign policy of the EU for security and defence 
diplomacy and actions. The Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009 and 
was yet another milestone in the continuing development of the CFSP. In Article 
42 TEU the Treaty declares that the CSDP ʻshall be an integral part of the 
common foreign and security policy.ʼ Furthermore, the CSDP is to provide ʻan 
operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assetsʼ, which the Union can 
then use for crisis-management operations, and ʻshall include the progressive 
framing of a common Union defence policy.ʼ The Treaty also includes both a 
mutual assistance and a solidarity clause and allowed for the creation of the EEAS 
– serving as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU, implementing the 
CFSP and other areas of the EU’s external representation, under the authority of 
the High Representative which both chairs and represents the policy field of the 
Union. Decisions falling under the CFSP require unanimity among member states 
in the Council but specific features can be decided on by qualified majority voting 
(QMV). 
 
Even though most EU member states have long accepted the supremacy of 
NATO on defence matters, the EU has taken small but decisive steps in recent 
years towards creating a common security and defence policy. In a swiftly 
changing world, the EU is constantly facing security challenges, both within its 
own borders, in its immediate neighborhood and even more distant regions. To 
address these challenges – not least after the EU continued to appear weak and 
timid during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, much like it had in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina a few years earlier (Peterson and Lavenex 2012, p. 193) – the EU 
commenced developing a common security and defence policy in 1999. The Nice 
Treaty marked the basic EU foreign policy goals – often referred to as the 
Petersberg tasks – which included humanitarian and rescue missions, 
peacekeeping, and crisis management (Cornish and Edwards 2001, pp. 588-589). 
The Treaty also introduced a new Political and Security Committee (PSC) of 
senior national officials which designated the cornerstone linking the CSDP to the 
CFSP, establishing it as a kind of operations arm of CFSP (Mix 2013, p. 10). 
Furthermore, a special EU Military Committee was set up and after 2001 and 
military officers were for the first time seen working in the EU’s Council building 
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(Peterson and Lavenex 2012, p. 193). All decisions on issues concerning aspects 
on common security and defence have to be adopted unanimously within the EU 
meaning that every member state has to approve of the establishment of a CSDP 
operation. However, the declaration of consent to launch an operation under the 
CSDP framework does not necessarily equal the willingness of EU member states 
to provide staff, i.e. troops. This has led to EU member states’ contributions to the 
conducted CSDP operations being both varied in frequency and force level. 
 
When the EU was first equipped with a military capability at the turn of the 
new millennium, the Union could develop a security strategy: a set of principles 
that could guide foreign policy action and specify how the CSDP might be 
deployed together with other EU policy instruments (Peterson 2012, p. 219). In 
2003, the former High Representative Javier Solana put together a long-term 
European Security Strategy (ESS) – a document entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a 
Better World’. At the heart of the document was the identification of five key 
threats – terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure and 
organized crime – as well as the identification of different measures the Union can 
apply to address these threats. These measures included the achievement of 
greater capabilities (for instance systemic use of pooled and shared assets, the 
sharing of intelligence and stronger diplomatic capabilities through a combination 
of the resources of member states), more coherence (common diplomatic efforts 
and better coordination), direct intervention in regional conflicts, which could 
involve the deployment of EU military and civilian expertise, and EU 
participation in multilateral solutions (Council of the European Union 2003). The 
implementation of the document was later revised in 2008, where the EU 
confirmed the validity of the ESS and the need to be ‘more capable, more 
coherent and more active’ in order for the ‘EU to reach its full potential’ 
(European External Action Service 2014a). Still, one must keep in mind that the 
CSDP is not a conventional defence policy whose immediate aim is the protection 
of national territory. Instead, the CSDP is concerned with ‘out-of-area’ operations 
which take place outside of the territories of the EU member states. As such it 
might be more helpful to see it as an international security policy (Chalmers et al. 
2010, p. 670). 
 
When the EU member states were shaping the CSDP, it was necessary for all 
parties concerned to settle on and clarify its relations with NATO. A strategic 
partnership in crisis management was developed between the EU and NATO, 
which rests on the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements, adopted in late 2002. The 
arrangements included allowing the EU to make use of NATO assets and 
capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations, ensured effective 
consultation and covered the exchange of classified information under reciprocal 
security protection rules (European External Action Service 2014b). By 
concluding the Berlin Plus arrangements, it facilitated the launch of the EU’s first 
ever military operation, Operation Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
  18 
Macedonia (FYROM) in March 2003. Originally it was envisaged that crises 
would lead to Western countries making a choice between the deployment of 
either the EU or NATO. However, the first two CSDP military operations 
(EUFOR Concordia and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina) entailed the 
EU following on from a NATO force and the EU borrowing NATO assets under 
the Berlin Plus arrangements (Rees 2011, p. 78). 
 
These operations reinforced the linkage between the two actors, perhaps 
underlining the EU’s role as subordinate to that of NATO. However, focusing 
solely on the geographical spread and size of CSDP operations would lead to their 
significance being underestimated. The EU has undertaken a diverse range of 
complex peace support operations, all of which have necessitated the use of 
different policy instruments, especially police units to combat crime (ibid, p. 79). 
Hagman argues that the EU’s comparative advantage lies not in the high-intensity 
warfare, but conflict prevention through the coordinated use of diplomatic and 
economic measures and crisis management with civilian and military means 
(Hagman 2002, p. 104). 
 
There is no doubt that the CFSP and the CSDP have developed significantly 
since their respective launches. Additionally, there are no indications that the 
trend we have been witnessing over the last years – that is towards more common 
initiatives and more coordination concerning crisis management and defence 
issues among EU members in general – will halt and its importance within the 
Union be any less. Today, the EU has become a rather established international 
actor that works together with and has set up cooperation processes with a number 
of international organizations – such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, AU – and 
individual states, which will be discussed more elaborately later on (Boguslawska 
2012, p. 91). 
 
In spite of its military and defence features, it is important to keep in mind 
that the activities of CSDP are not exclusively military in nature. Ever since the 
Feira European Council meeting in 2000, member states appreciated that complex 
interventions designed to prevent the breakout of large-scale conflict necessitate a 
hybrid range of capabilities, not just military. “This was a logical progression of 
the civilian power model, using reconstruction, aid, technical assistance, judicial 
and administrative instruments for a number of different purposes” (Rees 2011, p. 
79). These included incentivizing communities in the regions of conflict to 
eschew violence, policing ceasefires and keeping warring factions separate, 
rebuilding war-torn areas, and promoting a range of government mechanisms – 
rather than just winning a military victory (ibid, p. 79). In addition to military 
security, post-conflict reconstruction necessitates the resumption of a variety of 
public services. Police officers, lawyers, judges and administrators have all been 
designated as available for service overseas in CSDP operations in order to 
enhance capabilities in crisis management. Now, fifteen years after the EU 
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launched the CSDP, it has become predominantly oriented toward civilian actions, 
peacekeeping, conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization, and humanitarian 
missions, rather than conventional military combat operations (Mix 2013, p. 10). 
 
The EU has gradually expanded their peacekeeping and crisis management 
efforts over the last decade or so, and as of the end of early 2014, the EU had 
engaged in over thirty CSDP operations, whereas sixteen of them are still ongoing 
(European External Action Service 2014c). What these interventions have in 
common is that they have all been relatively small in scale, with the exception 
being EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina which amounted to a big-scale 
deployment of around 7.000 personnel. Also, because of the diversity of views 
amongst the EU member states, it has been unlikely that the Union would seek to 
carry out an intensive, high risk operation (Rees 2011, p. 77). Brimmer argues that 
this fits the US’ perception of the EU as an international actor, saying that ‘NATO 
is for hard security in relatively hostile environments,’ whereas ‘EU forces are for 
stabilization operations in more permissive settings’ (Brimmer 2007, p. 31). 
 
Geographically, the CSDP operations have been clustered in the Western 
Balkans, Europe’s Eastern frontiers, Africa and the Middle East. The Union has 
taken over operations initiated by other international actors, but also undertaken 
independent operations at long range overseas, most notably in Africa. Tasks have 
usually focused on a limited objective and have been conducted under the aegis of 
a European ʻframework nationʼ, performing both the planning and coordination 
functions. A case in point is Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) where France assumed the role of the framework nation. 
 
Table 1: List of ongoing CSDP operations (ISIS Europe 2014) 
 
ONGOING 
OPERATIONS 
Africa 
Balkans/Caucasus/ 
Eastern Europe 
Asia Middle East 
Military operations 
EUNAVFOR 
Somalia (Atalanta) 
EUFOR RCA 
EUFOR Althea 
(BiH) 
  
Military training 
missions 
EUTM Mali 
EUTM Somalia 
   
Supporting 
missions (security 
sector) 
EUCAP Nestor 
Horn of Africa 
EUCAP Sahel 
Niger 
EUSEC DRC 
   
Other supporting 
missions 
    
Monitoring 
missions 
 EUMM Georgia   
Rule of law 
missions 
 EULEX Kosovo   
Police missions EUPOL DRC   EUPOL 
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Afghanistan 
EUPOL COPPS 
Palestinian 
territories 
Border missions EUBAM Libya 
EUBAM Ukraine-
Moldova 
 EUBAM Rafah 
 
Table 2: A list of completed CSDP operations (ISIS Europe 2014) 
 
COMPLETED 
OPERATIONS 
Africa 
Balkans/Caucasus/ 
Eastern Europe 
Asia Middle East 
Military operations 
Artemis DRC 
EUFOR DRC 
EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA 
EUFOR Libya 
Concordia FYROM   
Military training 
missions 
    
Supporting 
missions (security 
sector) 
EUSSR Guinea 
Bissau 
EUNAVCO 
Somalia 
EUAVSEC 
South Sudan 
   
Other supporting 
missions 
Amis Sudan 
(AU) 
EUSR BST Georgia 
(border) 
EUPAT FYROM 
(police) 
EUPT Kosovo (rule 
of law) 
  
Monitoring 
missions 
 
EUMM Former 
Yugoslavia 
AMM Aceh  
Rule of law 
missions 
 
EU JUST Themis 
(Georgia) 
 
EUJUST LEX 
Iraq 
Police missions  
EUPM BiH 
EUPOL Proxima 
(FYROM) 
EUPOL Kinshasa 
  
Border missions     
 
4.2 Outsiders in CSDP Operations 
„There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described 
are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International co-operation 
is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-
operation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors.” 
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These words can be found in the European Security Strategy (Council of the 
European Union 2003) mentioned earlier, which emphasizes the importance for 
the EU to cooperate with like-minded states and organizations. This view was 
reiterated at the European Council meeting in December 2013 where “the 
European Council emphasize[d] the importance of supporting partner countries 
and regional organizations” and that “the Union remains fully committed to 
working in close collaboration with its global, transatlantic and regional partners.” 
Furthermore, it accented that “such collaboration should be further developed in a 
spirit of mutual reinforcement and complementarity” (European Council 2013). 
This view is in line with the Lisbon Treaty (Article 21 TEU) which recalls that 
multilateralism is at the core of the EU’s external action. “The Union shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations.” 
 
In the spirit of these words, the EU has worked towards developing an 
effective and balanced partnership with a number of states and organizations. 
Since its first operation, around 45 non-EU states have been engaged in CSDP 
operations, or around thirty if the states that have joined the Union since 2004 are 
subtracted. In 2003, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) 
benefited from the participation of fifteen third states and the first EU military 
operation in Africa – Operation Artemis in the DRC – saw the contribution of five 
partner states, including both South Africa and Brazil. Ever since the launch of the 
first CSDP operation, third states have been engaged in almost all operations and 
missions, although with uneven levels of participation. 
 
Table 3: Contributions of third states to CSDP operations (Tardy 2014, p. 3) 
 
Europe  
Albania * EUFOR Althea, EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
FYROM * EUFOR Althea 
Georgia * EUCAP Nestor, EUTM Mali, EUBAM Libya, EUFOR RCA 
Iceland * EUPM BiH, Concordia 
Moldova * --- 
Montenegro * EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
Norway * EUFOR Althea, EULEX Kosovo, EUPM BiH, EUPOL Afghanistan, 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Proxima, Concordia, 
AMM Aceh, EUJUST LEX, EUCAP Nestor 
Russia EUPM BiH, EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
Serbia * EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM 
Switzerland EUFOR Althea, EULEX Kosovo, EUPM BiH, EUPOL Proxima, EUFOR 
RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo, AMM Aceh, EUTM Mali 
Turkey * EUFOR Althea, EULEX Kosovo, EUPM BiH, EUPOL Proxima, Concordia, 
EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa 
Ukraine * EUPM BiH, EUPOL Proxima, EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
North America 
Canada * EUFOR Althea, EULEX Kosovo, EUPM BiH, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL 
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Kinshasa, EUPOL Afghanistan, Artemis (DRC) 
United States * EULEX Kosovo, EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo 
South America 
Argentina EUFOR Althea 
Brazil Artemis (DRC) 
Chile * EUFOR Althea 
Dominican Republic EUFOR Althea 
Africa 
Angola EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL RD Congo 
Mali EUPOL Kinshasa 
Morocco EUFOR Althea 
South Africa Artemis (DRC) 
Asia/Oceania 
Brunei AMM Aceh 
Malaysia AMM Aceh 
New Zealand * EUFOR Althea, EUPOL Afghanistan 
Philippines AMM Aceh 
Singapore AMM Aceh 
South Korea * --- 
Thailand AMM Aceh 
* States which have signed a Framework Participation Agreement with the EU. 
 
Cooperation between the Union and third countries must be seen in the 
broader context of the EU foreign policy. What is being achieved with the 
partnerships of the EU may not always be visible or viable to the short-term 
effectiveness of CSDP operations, but it is one of many dimensions of a much 
broader political environment in which the EU is gradually finding is place. 
4.2.1 Framework Participation Agreements 
Even though the drafting of policy guidelines regulating cooperation with third 
states dates back to 2001, the relationship between the EU and partner states 
within the CSDP was institutionalized in 2004 with the signing of the first 
Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs). To this day, fifteen such 
agreements have been finalized and agreements with Australia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Switzerland, Brazil and Colombia are currently in the making 
(Tardy 2014, p. 2). All five EU candidate countries – FYROM, Iceland, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey – have participated in CSDP operations and 
signed FPAs, much like all non-EU member states that are members of NATO
3
 
(see Table 3). Looking at partner states’ participation in CSDP operations, we see 
that Canada, Norway and Turkey are the ones that been especially active. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 Albania, Canada, Norway, the US and the two EU candidate countries mentioned earlier, Iceland and Turkey. 
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The FPAs provide the legal and political foundation for the third states’ 
involvement in CSDP operations. The agreements address issues relating to the 
status of personnel and forces, the modalities of information exchange, the 
involvement of third countries in the decision-making process and conduct of the 
operations. They also cover financial aspects, both for military and civilian 
operations. Partner countries that are interested in making a contribution to a 
CSDP operation are generally kept informed throughout the planning and 
decision-making process, using the existing structures for political dialogue. At a 
certain phase, the partners are invited to the relevant force-generation conferences. 
Following a Council decision to initiate an operation, a Committee of 
Contributors commences its work as the body responsible for the day-to-day 
conduct of the operation. The contributing partner countries are then represented 
in the Committee with the same obligations and rights as the participating EU 
member states (Boguslawska 2012, p. 91). 
 
By nature, non-member statesʼ participation in CSDP operations requires a 
certain degree of acceptance of EU practices as well as a degree of subordination 
(Tardy 2014, p. 4). The agreements state that third state contributions to CSDP 
operations are ʻwithout prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Unionʼ. 
This is a matter of principle, as it is central to the Union’s conception of 
partnership and a source of tension with partners. Tardy argues that this has for 
example hindered EU and US cooperation to a certain extent. Although the two 
parties signed an FPA in 2011, it only covers ʻcontributions of civilian personnel, 
units, and assets by the United States to EU crisis management operationsʼ, which 
can be explained by the US’ reluctance to place US troops under non-US 
command (ibid, p. 2). 
 
In addition to EU candidate countries and non-EU NATO members, three 
regional powers – Russia, Brazil and South Africa – have also contributed to 
CSDP operations, much like a number of other non-EU participants, including 
states from South America, Eastern Europe and Asia. Most of these partners have 
only contributed symbolically – either by very limited commitments or to 
operations located in their immediate vicinity like Asian states in the 2005 
monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia. Adding to their participation in CSDP 
operations, four countries (Norway, Turkey, Ukraine and FYROM) have been 
involved in the stand-by EU Battlegroups (ibid, p. 2). While a substantial number 
of third states have already engaged in CSDP operations, the Union also plans to 
further engage its Eastern and Mediterranean partners on a case-by-case basis, 
with the purpose to contribute to enhancing regional security and stability 
(European External Action Service 2013a). Still, the network being constructed 
remains loosely institutionalized as compared, for example, to NATO’s Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (Tardy 2014, p. 2). 
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4.2.2 What’s in it for the EU? 
The participation of non-EU member states in CSDP operations is, arguably, 
beneficial for both parties – that is the EU and its member states on the one hand, 
and the partner state in question on the other. Potential reasons for the 
participation of third states in CSDP operations have partly been addressed in 
chapter two and will be further examined with regards to Iceland in chapter five. 
 
Looking at things from the EU’s point of view, cooperation with partner states 
entails two primary dimensions. First, there is a capacity-related one, meaning that 
partner countries bring personnel, assets and expertise that the EU may possibly 
lack. The EU occasionally struggles to staff its operations so the partnerships 
make it possible for the Union to broaden the pool of potential contributors. Tardy 
(2014) mentions the contribution of Russia to EUFOR Tchad/RCA as a case in 
point, while Georgia’s contribution to the same operation was also welcomed as it 
filled a gap in the EU generation process. Also, the type of expertise provided by 
countries such as the US, Canada, Switzerland or Norway is of great value to the 
EU’s wide-ranging agenda. The second dimension is the political one, which is 
arguably the more important one of the two. Whether a CSDP operation is 
considered effective and visible enough or not, partly relies on if the EU can 
attract non-EU members and institutionalize its relationships with them. Tardy 
explains that to some extent, “a wide network of partners attest to the growing 
importance of the of the EU’s role in a ʻmarketʼ where other institutions (such as 
the UN, NATO or the OSCE) also operate”. Moreover, he argues that this is a 
clear demonstration of the ʻsoftʼ power wielded by the EU at work, entailing a 
tendency to appeal rather than threaten. “The legitimacy of EU operations is 
partly a function of the size of the community of states that the EU is able to bring 
together. As for all multilateral organizations, the long-term success of crisis 
management needs to combine the effectiveness of a limited but reliable number 
of stakeholders with the legitimacy that stems from collegiality” (Tardy 2014, p. 
4). 
4.2.3 Limitations of the Cooperation with Third States 
In spite of the cooperation between the EU and third states in CSDP operations, 
the material and political gains of this kind of partnership should not be 
exaggerated. Looking over third state participation over the last decade, their 
input have been rather limited, barring the Turkish, Russian and Georgian 
contributions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad and the Central African Republic 
(CAR) respectively. Contributions are generally not more than 20 staff and with 
the relatively small scale of most CSDP operations, it leaves a limited room for 
maneuver for third states in an operation to disrupt the general balance of 
personnel (Tardy 2014, p. 4). The management of partnerships can also be both 
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politically and administratively problematic. From an administrative perspective, 
the partnership can be disputed if the handful of experts provided by a third 
country is worth the overall effort. In political terms, the EU insists that the 
cooperation shall be guided by the ʻEUʼs strategic interestsʼ and that the partner 
states should ʻshare with the EU common values and principlesʼ. Meanwhile, the 
most valuable contributors may have different priorities and therefore become 
tough to handle and keep in check. The nature of the EU’s planning and decision-
making processes complicate relations with partner countries even further. Tardy 
explains that in practice, third states that are invited to contribute to a CSDP 
operation, are brought on board at a very late stage in the process, and then only 
given access to EU-issued documents once their participation has been accepted 
by the PSC. Informal contacts take place between the EEAS and the probable 
contributors that the EU has identified. However, they are not formally involved 
in the drafting of the concept of operations or the operation plan, nor do they 
participate in force generation conferences” (ibid, p. 4). In most cases, third 
countries are invited to ʻfill gapsʼ, but are obliged to accept both the EU’s timeline 
and procedures. 
 
In theory, third states have the ʻsame rights and obligations in terms of day-to-
day management of the operationʼ as the partaking EU member states. The 
general principle concerning the aspect of financing, is that aside from those costs 
that are subject to common funding, third states assume all costs associated with 
their participation in a given operation. However, Tardy stresses that even once an 
operation in launched, the various mechanisms in place – such as the Committee 
of Contributors – limits the involvement of partner countries, effectively reducing 
them to ʻsecond-class stakeholdersʼ. The result has been a series of complaints, 
with critics pointing to NATO and its more successful way of including partner 
countries in its operations. The EEAS has been looking at means to address this 
dilemma, possibly through privileged cooperation with a selection of third 
countries. However, it is unlikely that frictions within this kind of cooperation 
with non-member states will ever completely disappear (ibid, p. 4). 
4.3 Iceland: Torn between East and West 
Situated in the North Atlantic Ocean – both on the Eurasian and North American 
continental plates – Iceland has throughout its history been somewhat torn 
between looking towards the east and west. 
 
Economy 
From an economic perspective, Iceland has focused eastwards and is very 
dependent on European markets with around 70-80% of its exports entering the 
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EU internal market (Statistics Iceland). Iceland has developed very close ties to 
the Union and is veritably as close to being an EU member as possible – much 
like Norway and Liechtenstein. Iceland’s current relations with the EU chiefly 
take the form of cooperation within three different frameworks: the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) which Iceland became a member of in 1970; the 
European Economic Area which it joined in 1993; and the Schengen Agreement 
which Iceland joined in 2001. These relations have mostly been based on 
economic premises. Iceland joined EFTA to facilitate trade relations with Europe 
and these relations were strengthened further by Iceland becoming part of the 
internal market through the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, Iceland’s Schengen 
participation is partly intended to secure the necessary free movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital – the core intention of the internal market (Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2013a). Though not a member of the EU, Iceland is far from 
immune to its influence. These close ties mean that Iceland, much like the 
member states themselves, is affected by most changes in the EU, with Iceland 
implementing a large portion of EU rules and regulations. According to an official 
report on Iceland-EU relations from 2007, it is generally estimated that Iceland 
implements between 70-80% of all EU legislation (Prime Minister’s Office 
2007a, p. 45), although the proportion can be very difficult to measure (Jónsdóttir 
2013, p. 5). 
 
Still, one difference between a non-member like Iceland and the EU member 
states is very apparent – the level of political influence on these changes. Being a 
non-member, Iceland only has very limited access to the EU decision-making 
process. Icelandic officials are frequently consulted before the EU makes its final 
decision on issues related to the internal market or Schengen. Therefore, Icelandic 
officials are in a position to have some influence in the decision-shaping process 
or the stage where the European Commission or the Council is drawing up new 
legislative proposals, although this potential for influence varies with the policy 
area in question. The EEA Agreement contains provisions for input from the 
EEA/EFTA countries
4
 at various stages, prior to new legislation being adopted. 
This input takes various forms, such as the participation of EEA/EFTA experts in 
various EU committees or the submission of EEA/EFTA comments and the 
adaption of resolutions in response to initiatives from the Commission (Rieker 
2006a, p. 284). Iceland’s Schengen participation interestingly entails that Iceland 
has, in fact, gone further in the European integration process in certain policy 
areas than some full EU member states, like the UK and Ireland. Put differently, 
the assessment of the standing of full member states versus non-member states in 
European integration process is not as black and white as first might be expected. 
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 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is a free trade organization between four European countries 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) that operates in parallel with and is linked to the EU. While 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are participants in the EEA, Switzerland is not. 
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With the country obliged to implement a great portion of EU legislation 
without proper channels to influence them, one might wonder why Iceland did not 
apply for full membership prior to 2009. Many explanations have been 
mentioned, including a dominant domestic discourse on sovereignty and 
independence, a Euro-sceptical political elite (Kristinsson and Þórhallsson 2004, 
p. 158) and how influential sectors – such as fisheries and agriculture – have 
managed to capture the ‘heart of the Icelandic nation’ – successfully convincing 
the majority of the people that Iceland’s interests would best be served outside of 
the Union (Einarsson 2007, p. 1). Iceland’s participation in the EEA may also be 
one of the most salient reasons for a history of a lacking of interest in full 
membership (Jónsdóttir 2013, p. 3). Until the banking collapse in 2008, the EEA 
Agreement was considered adequate to serve the country’s interests. While the 
agreement allowed Iceland access to the internal market, it also allowed Iceland to 
remain outside less attractive areas, primarily the common fisheries policy (CFP) 
– a policy field that has been described as one of the Union’s biggest policy 
failures. The importance of fisheries for the Icelandic economy is big, so many 
have considered the CFP reason enough for Iceland not to become a full EU 
member. However, following Iceland’s crash in 2008 and a government change 
the year after, Iceland did apply for full EU membership. Accession talks were 
well on their way, but after the 2013 elections and yet another government 
change, the new foreign minister decided to dissolve the accession team and 
suspend negotiations. 
 
Security and defence 
While having looked east from an economic perspective, Iceland has looked 
towards the west when addressing its security and defence concerns. In 1940, 
during World War II, British troops arrived in Iceland but one year later the 
defence of Iceland was transferred from the British to the US (Björgúlfsdóttir 
1989, pp. 73-75). To secure its defence after the war, Iceland became a founding 
member of NATO, and was (and still is) the only member state to have no army. 
However, the West welcomed Icelandic membership as its geographical position 
in the North Atlantic had proven itself to be both strategically and geopolitically 
important during World War II and and would remain so in the Cold War. In 
1951, the US and Iceland signed an agreement where the US took responsibility 
for the defence of the island nation. This resulted in US military presence in 
Iceland until 2006 when the last US troops and fighter jets left the island as 
Washington considered them needed to be stationed elsewhere in the world as 
Icelandʼs geopolitical position was not as important to the US as it had been 
during the Cold War years. 
 
The international system has undergone fundamental changes since the end of 
the Cold War, with strong implications for a small state such as Iceland. Many 
small, wealthy states have pursued regional integration to advance their own goals 
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and influence, but some are now threatened by the expansion of regional 
institutions, such as the EU. This results in an international system that offers 
great opportunities and great risks for small states (Hey 2003, pp. 1-2). One can 
argue that today, small states enjoy more international prestige and visibility than 
at any other time in history. Their physical security is in most cases ensured, while 
the rise of transnational efforts, such as the EU and NATO, has put them on a 
legal and diplomatic footing with larger states (ibid, p. 1). The end of the Cold 
War meant that smaller states were no longer necessarily pawns in a global 
competition for superpower. However, in the case of Iceland, the country had 
grown quite accustomed to its role and place in the Cold War, where it benefited 
from the presence of the US army – both concerning national security, but also in 
economic terms. Following the US withdrawal in 2006, Iceland sought defence 
arrangements based on its NATO membership – involving increased defence and 
rescue cooperation with the US, UK, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and other 
NATO members (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013b) – and the bilateral 1951 
Defence Agreement between Iceland and the US. Thus, the two remain the 
fundamental pillars of Iceland’s security and defence (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2014a). 
 
In 2009, a group working under the foreign minister published a national risk 
assessment report, where it analyzed possible global, societal, and military threats 
for Iceland. The report was the first of its kind in Icelandic history. The group 
concluded that Iceland faced no direct military threats from other states or 
alliances in the short- or medium-term (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009a, p. 4). 
Still, if something like that were to happen – for example as a consequence of a 
conflict between superpowers – Iceland would be totally dependent on others in 
terms of security. In such an event, it would first and foremost test the US 
Defence Agreement and the 5
th
 article of NATO’s Washington Treaty which 
stipulates that in an event of an aggression, other nations would come with help to 
repel the enemy and vice-versa. However, overall, the risk assessment report 
concludes that Iceland’s greatest security threat stems from potential natural 
disasters (ibid, p. 68). 
4.3.1 Iceland and Crisis Management 
Following the Cold War coming to an end and the collapse of its original raison 
d'être, NATO went through a necessary transformation and evolved from being 
the traditional defence alliance it originally set out to be, to a coalition using its 
capacity to manage conflict outside its own borders, first in the Balkans and 
subsequently Afghanistan (Bertram 2006, p. 1). This drastic change had extensive 
impact on Iceland’s security identity (Ómarsdóttir 2008, p. 58). Almost overnight, 
a contribution in the form of land was not enough to guarantee Icelandic interests 
within NATO (Baldvinsson 2008, p. 138). To address the increasing pressure 
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from other NATO members for Iceland to contribute more to the alliance, Iceland 
chose to participate in international peacekeeping operations to safeguard its 
status within the alliance. 
 
The formal launch of Icelandic participation in crisis management operations 
can be traced to 1994, when three Icelandic peacekeepers joined the Norwegian 
armed forces in the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNPROFOR). Although the Icelandic government had previously been asked to 
participate in international peacekeeping operations, they had sidestepped on the 
grounds of the country having no army (Baldvinsson 2008, p. 139). With an 
increased number of UN peacekeeping operations and increased awareness among 
Western leaders that the West had to engage itself seeking a resolution in the 
Balkan conflicts, there was ever more demand for an Icelandic contribution, much 
like from other countries. After the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, 
NATO took over a number of tasks in the Balkans, previously held by the UN. 
The alliance pushed for all member states to contribute, and approached Iceland 
especially, which could no longer look the other way. Iceland agreed to focus on 
deploying experts instead of troops to the different regions of conflict where 
NATO was active. Iceland and NATO initially settled on Iceland sending doctors 
and other medical staff to work within the armed forces of fellow NATO member 
states (ibid, p. 139). As the armed forces of NATO members partially included 
civilian staff, Iceland could partake in the works and functions of armies. 
Although the Icelandic peacekeepers always had a special status within the armies 
in which they operated, the Icelandic army doctors and army nurses held ranks, 
uniforms and in some cases arms (ibid, p. 139). 
 
In 2001, Iceland launched a civilian peacekeeping unit – the Iceland Crisis 
Response Unit (ICRU) – for the sake of operating within international 
organizations, especially NATO. It was considered a non-military ‘peacekeeping 
force’ of individuals (police, doctors and nurses, lawyers, air traffic controllers, 
administrators, etc.) who were to be available for rapid deployment to regions of 
conflict (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 334). Iceland had hopes of that the unit 
would result in attracting greater goodwill from its NATO allies – most 
importantly the US – and that Washington might be willing to extend its military 
presence on the island which it had been scaling down ever since the end of the 
Cold War (Þórhallsson 2013). 
 
The nature of the ICRU is very different compared to its ‘counterparts’ in 
other countries, as only civilian personnel work within the ICRU (Iceland Crisis 
Response Unit 2008, p. 5). Ever since the unit was launched, a number of 
Icelanders have participated in international crisis management operations, 
functioning under the helm of various international organizations, including 
NATO, OSCE, the EU and the UN and a few of its agencies, such as UNICEF, 
UN Women (previously UNIFEM) and the World Food Programme – which has 
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also been considered part of Iceland’s overall contribution to these organizations. 
In addition to the two CSDP operations mentioned earlier, ICRU has participated 
in a number of other international crisis management efforts – i.e. Afghanistan, 
Sri Lanka, Iraq, Kosovo, Serbia, Sudan and Liberia – with the most extensive 
being the NATO operation in Afghanistan (ISAF) where Icelandic personnel for 
example temporarily ran the Kabul International Airport. Domestic partners and 
institutions that have provided the ICRU with staff include the Icelandic Coast 
Guard, the Fire Department of the Icelandic Capital Area, the office of the 
National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, the Icelandic Search and Rescue 
Association (ICE-SAR) and Isavia (national airport and air navigation service 
provider of Iceland) (Iceland Crisis Response Unit 2008, p. 6). During the first 
years of its existence, the ICRU deployed on average around twenty-five 
personnel abroad at any one time, although the number temporarily rose to around 
forty on occasions when new missions had been established prior to others being 
finished (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 334). 
 
Following the 2008 banking collapse, the ICRU budget was slashed and has 
now been reduced to less than 30% of what it was in 2007.
5
 This development has 
naturally had an effect on the scope and functions of the unit. In the last few years, 
there has been a change in the workings of the ICRU with an ever increasing 
focus on women activity. Great emphasis has been put on equaling the gender 
balance within ICRU activities and that the operations in which the ICRU 
partakes, benefits women as well as men (Iceland Crisis Response Unit 2008, p. 
6). In 2010, 45% of all deployed experts of the ICRU were women (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 2011, p. 69). 
4.3.2 Iceland and the CFSP 
A school of thought led by France has seen CSDP operations as a means to 
bolster the EU’s strategic credibility which will gradually lead it in the direction 
of a full-blown common defence community. These arguments are taken very 
seriously by smaller countries, viewing and linking their own survival to the 
efficiency of international institutions (Bailes 2008, p. 81). However, Icelandic 
governments have not taken the official view that national defence would be 
supported by taking part in the CFSP and the development of the CSDP, as 
opposed by Norway’s approach where governments have very much been drawn 
towards the EU for security reasons. In fact, Norwegian political leaders (both the 
Social Democrats and the Conservatives) pushed for EU membership in the early 
1990s as a means to bolster the state’s security (Þórhallsson 2008, pp. 126-127). 
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 The state contribution to the ICRU amounted to 600 million ISK in 2007 (Iceland Crisis Response Unit 2008, 
pp. 5-6), while it amounted to 173 million ISK in 2014 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2014). 
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Historically, Iceland has not been active in the policy-making processes of 
other security organizations in Europe, such as the OSCE and the former Western 
European Union (WEU) (Þórhallsson 2013). The Icelandic government currently 
has a limited opportunity to influence the decision-making process in the CFSP 
but has, to the best of its ability, tried to express its views and guard its interests 
whenever an opportunity has arisen (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 24). On 
the basis of the EEA Agreement, Iceland can sign up to EU statements on foreign 
and security issues, and in most cases there is a clear correlation between the EU 
policy and the Icelandic one, with both actors generally sharing the same values 
and interests (Ásgrímsson 2004, p. 24). The formal arrangements concerning the 
relationship between allied third states and the CFSP were formalized in the early 
years of the millennium. They came to include meetings between the PSC and the 
(at the time) six allied non-EU members (15+6 (the EU15 and Norway, Turkey, 
Iceland, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic)) and would some of them be 
on ministerial level (Prime Ministerʼs Office 2006, p. 8). Meetings could also take 
the format where they included the candidate countries (15+15 (the EU15 and 13 
candidate countries, and Norway and Iceland)) (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, pp. 
332-333). The arrangements included the setup of an ad hoc Committee of 
Contributors in relation to each specific operation (Rieker 2006a, pp. 284, 288). 
Additionally, when joint NATO-EU meetings took place to develop the 
cooperation foreseen between the two institutions, Iceland would of course have a 
full seat at the table on the NATO side (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 333). 
When the EU created the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004, Iceland 
decided – contrary to Norway – not to take up its option to join in the new 
agency’s activities through an Administrative Agreement. The agency partly aims 
at armaments and defence technology collaboration but Iceland lacks both armed 
forces and a defence industry, and “popular feeling is broadly hostile to the global 
arms trade’s ʻmerchants of deathʼ” (Bailes and Rafnsson 2012, p. 110). The basis 
for Icelandic participation in CSDP operations is the FPA signed in 2005, which 
makes it possible for Iceland to participate in both civilian and military crisis 
management operations conducted by the EU. 
 
The EU recognizes that with no armed forces, Iceland has “limited resources 
to contribute to EU military crisis management operations, but it is nevertheless 
able to offer its expertise in the areas of human rights, gender equality and post-
conflict assistance” (European Commission 2011, p. 7). As previously mentioned, 
Iceland has participated in two CSDP operations so far. First, the police mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), where Iceland contributed with 25.000 euros 
per year (Alþingi 2009, p. 3) and deployed two police officers from 2003 until 
2009 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013c). The aim of that CSDP operation – 
which is civilian in nature – is to establish sustainable policing arrangements in 
the country under Bosnian ownership and in accordance with best European and 
international practice in this area (Europa 2008). All EU members have 
contributed to the operation, alongside Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, 
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Ukraine and Iceland. Secondly, Iceland contributed to the first ever military 
operation of the EU – Operation Concordia in FYROM in 2003. In that operation 
– which core aim was, at the explicit request of the FYROM government, to 
contribute further to a stable, secure environment and to allow the implementation 
of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement – Iceland contributed with filling a 
position of a press officer (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013c). The operation 
made use of NATO assets and capabilities, which was made possible by the 
completion of work on the Berlin Plus arrangements. The operation was launched 
in March 2003 and completed in December that same year (European External 
Action Service 2014d). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that prior to the 
collapse of the banking sector in 2008, Iceland was planning to participate in 
EULEX – the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo launched in 2009. Iceland 
planned to deploy two experts to that operation (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
2008), but the collapse resulted in Iceland calling off its proposed deployments. 
This means that Iceland is currently not participating in any CSDP operation. 
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5 Analysis 
The Icelandic nation has a very special relationship with the concept of European 
defence. First, it has a history of a reluctant attitude towards the EU, and secondly, 
it has resisted from establishing armed forces ever since its birth as a modern 
independent state in 1944 (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 328). This has resulted 
in Iceland-CSDP relations generally being a rather sensitive subject, although not 
consistently openly controversial (Bailes and Rafnsson 2012, p. 109). 
 
The end of the Cold War turned out to have strong consequences for Iceland 
and its security. During the late 1990s and early 2000s the US steadily reduced its 
troop numbers at its Keflavík military base, leading to questions on the US’ 
commitment to the security of Iceland. The mood in Iceland turned out to evolve 
similarly to that in Norway after the end of the Cold War – a feeling of a 
possibility of imminent marginalization (Rieker 2006b, p. 308). When looking at 
the case of Norway, Archer (2004) argues that marginalization draws on a number 
of fears. First, Norway did not benefit from the end of the Cold War like, say 
Denmark or the states in Central Europe. Second, the urgency of the Cold War 
threat declined, with the US and other allied forces lessening their involvement in 
the defence of Norway. Third, there was a concern that Norway would disappear 
off the conceptual map of those making new security arrangements in Europe. “It 
is a relief not to be talked about as much as Serbia, Cyprus or Georgia, but there is 
a certain feeling of rejection on being ignored altogether” (Archer 2004, p. 139). 
A similar argumentation can be applied to the case of Iceland, where the country 
had grown accustomed to having an US army to secure its national territory. 
During the 1990s, however, it became clear the US wanted to reduce its military 
presence on the island, if not leave altogether. Halldór Ásgrímsson, the Icelandic 
foreign minister (1995-2004), worked under the conditions of a looming US 
departure from Iceland, so a fear of marginalization can explain Iceland 
increasingly looking towards Europe at a time when Europe was designing its new 
security environment. By looking to contribute to CSDP operations, the 
government sought not to get isolated, even though the EU members would be 
more self-sufficient in security matters, as Iceland’s policy had always been to 
maintain a balance in its relations with the US on the one hand and Europe on the 
other (Baldvinsson 2008, p. 143). Furthermore, during the mid-1990s, the 
Icelandic government had made a conscious decision to increase its participation 
in the international community and contributions to international organizations 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2000a). Þórhallsson (2007) argues that this policy 
shift can be explained by four different factors: (i) Iceland’s interests had changed 
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and also the way Iceland defined their interests; (ii) increased resources, primarily 
entailing that Iceland had bolstered its foreign service; (iii) Icelandic politicians 
had changed their attitude towards international relations; and (iv) Iceland was 
subject to increased international pressure and impact of international 
organizations on national issues. 
 
When the EU member states were initially preparing to give the Union a 
capacity for military action under its own command, Icelandic officials cautioned 
about the risk of replicating NATO and undermining the trans-Atlantic bond 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2000b, Bailes and Rafnsson 2012, p. 109). Iceland, 
alongside Turkey, was especially vocal during the formulation stages of the 
CSDP, and expressed its concerns as it became clear that the EU did not intend to 
offer the non-EU members of NATO similar access to meetings and opportunities 
for co-decision that they were granted in the WEU – the IGO whose tasks had 
been transferred to the CSDP when launched. Bailes and Þórhallsson (2006) trace 
how the Icelandic delegation – both within NATO and the WEU – called for 
better treatment during this formulation stage of the CSDP. Iceland had been a 
low-key but non-problematic participant in the WEU up until the point when EU 
members opted to absorb the operational aspect of European defence into the 
framework of the EU. Therefore, the end of the WEU had direct effect on 
Iceland’s security and defence interests. “In a break with tradition, the Icelanders 
were on several occasions among the toughest ‘hold-outs’ in the final process of 
reaching agreement on communiqués that contained allusions to future EU-NATO 
relations” (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 332). They argue that the reasons for 
Icelandic politicians’ and officials’ verbal concerns – given the absence of 
material implications for their national security arrangements – were fear of losing 
their seat at a ‘security table’ and that an EU-led defence policy would challenge 
and segregate NATO, leading to the damaging of joint European and US interests 
and even weakening the trans-Atlantic solidarity, the very basis of Iceland’s own 
security and safety (ibid, p. 332).  
 
The Icelandic government had also more general reasons, although not openly 
expressed, for focusing on what was problematic, rather than beneficial with the 
EU’s new initiative (Bailes and Rafnsson 2012, p. 109). First, the CSDP was 
designed to restrict the EU’s military role to launch peace operations out of its 
own area, rather than acting jointly in Europe’s own defence. Over the years, 
Icelandic political leaders have generally seen security and defence in national and 
territorial terms. “Their mental map of what has to be defended doesn’t go much 
beyond their own territorial waters. It is logical that such states will only want to 
‘integrate’ in the defence/security field if what they gain in (concrete) national 
protection seems to outweigh that they lose in national independence” (Bailes 
2009, p. 138). Through the years, the Icelandic political elite have considered the 
US as the only credible protector. Therefore the government could not expect any 
added value for themselves from the new EU initiative. This view was also 
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apparent in the Prime Minister’s Office 2006 report on European affairs, where it 
is concluded that at the time of writing, the EU did not provide the necessary 
structural characteristics necessary in order to be a potential future defence partner 
for Iceland, in the case of the US terminating the 1951 Defence Agreement (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2006, pp. 12-13). “Today’s EU cannot give the direct territorial 
defence assurances that would fit Nordic, including Icelandic, national needs. It 
can give security coverage/support in many areas of internal security, but only at a 
price of standardization and intrusion upon sovereignty which is much greater 
than anything NATO ever imposed, and which may still seem too high for many 
Nordic citizens given the rather low level of threats they perceive in their own 
area from terrorism, organized crime and other internal violence” (Bailes 2009, p. 
138). However, unlike Iceland, Norway – another third state participant in CSDP 
operations – has chosen to contribute greatly and integrate ever more into the 
EU’s security structure. Interestingly, in the case of Norway, their influence in 
CSDP processes has decreased in parallel with the acceleration of the integration 
process in this particular policy area (Rieker 2006a, p. 282). The second aspect 
that Iceland considered problematic with the CSDP was that its objectives and 
ethos were first and foremost framed by the UK and France – two interventionist 
and ex-imperial powers. These nations’ willingness to deploy troops worldwide, 
and their evident interventionist defence structures and policies, greatly contrasted 
Iceland’s distinct attachment “to its non-military status and the promotion of 
peace, and its tendency to identify with small state ʻunderdogsʼ in world affairs” 
(Bailes and Rafnsson 2012, p. 110). 
 
In 2000, foreign minister Ásgrímsson stated that it was especially important 
that both the EU and NATO would be willing to be flexible in order for the two to 
reach an agreement on cooperation. Likewise, it was of utmost importance to 
secure the European non-EU members a right to participate in the consultation 
stages of EU-led operations and the operations themselves (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2000c). The minister even made it clear that Iceland had made and had to 
make “every effort not to have to choose between Europe and North America in 
its cooperation on security and defence” (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 332). 
“The Icelandic government has always supported any initiative of European states 
in the field of security and defence. We have always been understanding of the 
EU members’ will to shape a common security and defence policy. Of course, it is 
not our task to tell EU member states what to do concerning their own matters. 
However, it is the obligation of the Icelandic government to engage itself when 
decisions taken within the EU concern Icelandic interests” (Ásgrímsson 2000a, 
see also Ásgrímsson 2000b
6
). The minister stressed that consultation was of great 
importance, especially in times of crisis. NATO’s experience showed that even 
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  36 
though military contributions are a fundamental prerequisite for action, 
comprehensive political unity is of no less importance. Such unity cannot be 
achieved hastily in times of crisis, but is obtained by regular consultations and 
cooperation in times of peace (Ásgrímsson 2000a). 
 
Analyzing the minister’s speech (Ásgrímsson 2000a) – held at conference in 
Reykjavík on Western cooperation and the development of European security and 
defence matters around the time of the Nice European Council meeting in late 
2000 – one cannot but get the feeling the minister is concerned with that there is a 
train leaving so to speak, and Iceland might miss it and get left behind on the 
platform. Ásgrímsson stresses that whatever would be decided on concerning the 
participation of the six non-EU NATO members in future CSDP operations, it is 
clear that four of them (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Turkey) had 
already applied for EU membership. “When the time comes that two or three 
states in the six state group the consultation arrangements are directed towards, 
stand outside the EU, I fear that the importance of the consultations will inevitably 
dwindle, similar to what happened to the political dialogue of the EEA when three 
EFTA/EEA states
7
 joined the EU. This is a reality we have to face up to” 
(Ásgrímsson 2000a). He concludes by saying, that it is a certainty that the security 
and defence developments in Europe can have great effect on Iceland’s position in 
the international community. With increasing European cooperation, NATO will 
change. However, it does not mean that it will weaken. “With increased European 
cooperation in the field of security and defence, we must partake as much as 
possible, if we want to maintain the status we have had in the cooperation of 
Western democratic states over the last half a century” (ibid). 
 
Once Turkey’s chief concerns about future EU-NATO relations had been 
addressed in a political deal of late 2002, and NATO as a whole was ready to 
support the first CSDP operations, Iceland had no basis for further obstruction 
(Bailes and Rafnsson 2012, p. 110). Indeed, Iceland chose to contribute police and 
other civilian personnel to two of the first CSDP operations in the Balkans – in 
FYROM and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, even prior to the Turkish impasse, 
Iceland had followed the example of Norway and a number of other non-EU 
members in using direct contributions to CSDP activities as a way of ʻbuyingʼ 
influence and status in the process (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 334). The 
stress and challenges caused for Iceland at the broader political and institutional 
level by the emergence of the CSDP seemed to have been largely laid to rest by 
2005. The successful set up of two successive EU operations with NATO 
planning support showed that the institutions could work together in a 
complementary fashion (ibid, p. 341). 
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 The three EFTA states Ásgrímsson is referring to are Austria, Finland and Sweden. They joined the EU in 
1995. 
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Generally speaking, Iceland considers the EU’s peacekeeping and crisis 
management efforts to be consistent with its own policy and the ICRU’s activities 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013d and 2014c, p. 2). “Iceland shares the 
objectives of the EU in crisis management and conflict prevention. It has aligned 
itself with major EU policy declarations. The main objectives of the Icelandic 
policy include promotion of peace and stability, human rights and gender equality, 
post conflict assistance and support to civil society” (European Commission 2011, 
p. 5). However, former foreign ministers have clearly stated that it is in Iceland’s 
best interest that NATO continues to be the foundation on which the continent’s 
security and defence cooperation is grounded upon (Sverrisdóttir 2006). 
Ásgrímsson shared a similar view back in 2002, saying that a fundamental aspect 
of all policy-making concerning Icelandic participation in crisis management 
operations is that all commitments made to the EU in this field, shall always take 
the country’s commitments to NATO into account, and that NATO should take 
precedence whenever participation in operations is being considered (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 2002a, p. 34; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2002b, p. 9 and 
Ingimundarson 2007, p. 159). This has also been reflected in the fact that until 
2006, an overwhelming majority, around 70%, of all Icelandic peacekeeping 
deployments were sent abroad on NATO operations (Baldvinsson 2008, p. 173). 
However, foreign minister Valgerður Sverrisdóttir (2006-2007) stated that Iceland 
must also look at how it can strengthen its cooperation with the EU in the field of 
security and defence. “Iceland’s geographic position in Europe, must make the 
EU a logical partner in the fight against many of the threats which we can be 
faced with in the future – like terrorism and transnational, organized crime such as 
drug and human trafficking” (Sverrisdóttir 2006). 
 
Looking specifically at Bailes’ typology we see how some of the different 
motivations apply to the case of Iceland. Of course, the trouble with all these 
different motivations and justifications for participating in operations overseas – 
which can be quite convincing – is that they make more sense to politicians, 
strategists and other parts of the expert security establishment. Meanwhile, with 
ever more of these operations overseas, these same motivations and justifications 
may seem confusing and perhaps contradictory to the general public (Bailes 2008, 
p. 85). 
5.1 Direct National Motivations 
Iceland has, much like other small states, sought to exercise what control it could 
over the broader set of opportunities offered to it by the international environment. 
During the last years, there has been a propensity to engage with partners and to 
exercise influence with them. While the fear of marginalization, as described 
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earlier, might be categorized under the heading of ʻdirect national motivationsʼ in 
Bailes’ typology, there are also other motivations for Iceland’s CSDP 
participation that fall under the same heading. 
 
Post-colonial connections 
Iceland does not have a history of colonialism, except itself being a former colony 
of Denmark and Norway. Therefore, this motivation, as described by Bailes, does 
not apply to the case of Iceland. 
 
Good training and testing national forces 
Compared to other states, Icelandic politicians, civil servants and other domestic 
actors have generally had very limited knowledge in the field of defence and 
security. Of course, this is primarily due to the fact that Iceland has no army and 
its defence policy has entirely relied on policy-making in Washington and NATO 
(Þórhallsson 2013, p. 11). In the late 1990s, when Iceland had decided to increase 
its participation in international peacekeeping operations, a group working on 
behalf of the foreign minister concluded that Iceland and neighboring states would 
both benefit from cooperating together concerning preparation and training 
response to imminent threats. “Looking to the future, Iceland’s participation in 
international cooperation concerning immigration and the fight against terrorism, 
the activities of international police and peacekeeping operations, and territorial 
and civil protection training, must be seen as an investment in Iceland’s own 
security” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1999). According to official documents, 
Iceland contributes in a tangible way by participating in international crisis 
management operations and the training and experience the relevant experts 
gather involves significant long-term benefits for the state and nation (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 1999 and 2014b). Iceland’s participation in CSDP operations was 
therefore clearly motivated in part by seeking to train nationals, creating a better 
national knowledge base, acquiring particular inside knowledge or improving 
interoperability. This view – that participating generated good training and 
experience for Icelandic nationals – was reiterated in the 2009 Risk Assessment 
Report (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009a, p. 43). 
 
‘Quid quo pro’ 
The motivation or reasoning whereby a contribution has been provided in order to 
please another actor – so as to increase the likelihood of that actor being more 
supportive and intervene, should it fall into difficulties – has been quite blatant in 
the choices of a number of small-to-medium sized states in Europe in the last few 
decades (Bailes 2008, p. 79). These countries cannot realistically expect to defend 
their territories with their own armed forces. Bailes says it becomes more 
compelling in proportion as it becomes harder to have faith in the automatic 
execution of NATO collective defence commitments, which in turn, requires 
‘extra protection moneyʼ to be paid for favored treatment (ibid, p. 79). 
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This motivation is very applicable to Iceland, which especially established the 
ICRU and increased its crisis management participation to appease international 
organizations and support the government’s constant aim of maintaining the US 
military presence on the island (Þórhallsson 2013, p. 11). A similar logic can be 
applied to Iceland and the CSDP, where a new European security community was 
being designed and Iceland wanted to maintain its good relations with the Union 
(Þórhallsson 2009). 
 
Territorial security concerns 
Looking through the available documents, no direct mention is given to territorial 
security concerns as a motivation for Icelandic participation in CSDP operations. 
 
Groups setting up peacekeeping units as a way to regional reconciliation 
As elaborated on in Bailes’ typology, this motivation for participation in overseas 
operations is not applicable to Iceland. 
5.2 Strategic Motivations 
States which are preoccupied with their own influence within international 
institutions and organizations may sometimes seek to leverage their own 
operational contributions for a general improvement of status. This approach may 
even take the form of countries seeking recognition or trade-offs in other policy 
fields where it is generally not as easy for them to gain credit. Perhaps this is 
especially prevalent in institutions such as the EU. Medium-size or bigger powers, 
like Turkey and Russia, may hope that they can influence the EU’s policies 
through their presence in CSDP operations (Tardy 2014, p. 3). Furthermore, 
Bailes argues that non-member states working as partners of either the EU or 
NATO respectively, such as Iceland and Norway in the first case or Finland or 
Sweden in the second, are clearly motivated to join in institutional operations as a 
ʻback doorʼ route to influence (Bailes 2008, p. 82). Although not a full member, 
Iceland is very dependent on negotiations and the development of EU policy as an 
EEA member. Much like Norway – which has been described to have sought to 
‘trade troops for increased influence’ in the EU (Græger 2002) – Iceland can 
attempt to affect the EU policy process in areas that fall under the EEA 
Agreement. Lack of resources in order to effectively lobby in the early stages of 
the policy process is of course a big hindrance, but participation in CSDP 
operations might give Iceland more leverage within the EU as a whole (Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2009a, p. 43). 
 
Another apparent strategic motivation for Iceland’s increased international 
peacekeeping efforts, including CSDP operations, is the country’s decision to run 
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for a seat in the UN Security Council for the period 2009-2010 (Sigurðsson 2007). 
In an attempt of increasing its activities in the international arena, Iceland 
announced its decision to campaign in 1998. Although the decision did not have 
public support in Iceland, it was a milestone in the development of a small state, 
seeking to increase its international presence. Critics of the campaign pointed at 
Iceland’s inexperience in security and defence issues, the campaign’s great 
financial cost, and that if elected, Iceland would simply become a ʻpuppetʼ of the 
US in the Security Council (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009b). At the time of 
the foreign minister’s announcement of Iceland running, there were still ten years 
until the vote in the UN General Assembly on which countries would get the 
seats
8
. The UN Security Council has a big role concerning international 
peacekeeping and crisis management efforts, so in order to gain credibility and try 
to secure as many votes as possible, Iceland was is dire need to step up its own 
international crisis management efforts. Prime minister Geir Haarde stated in 2007 
that by campaigning, Iceland’s new vision and increased participation in the 
international community was emphasized and that “Iceland was not an incapable 
micro state, but a powerful small state” (Haarde 2007). 
 
Actions in response to ‘new threats’ 
Bailes underlines that a response to ʻnew threatsʼ, such as the proliferation of 
WMDs, has not yet sparked a European-led collective military action in recent 
years and is unlikely to do so (Bailes 2008, p. 80). Rather, Europeans have been 
faced with a choice of whether or not to join US-led interventions of such a type. 
Motives for going along with military action on these grounds can take various 
forms, not just agreeing with the need for action. One motive has been to get ʻon 
the insideʼ of US’ plans – to get a seat at the table – in order to have some 
prospects of guiding or moderating the US, and even working towards a trade-off 
in some other foreign policy areas. Concerning smaller states, the hope of gaining 
a pay-off in terms of direct national favor from the strategic leader can come into 
play (ibid, p. 80). Over the years, this approach has been prevalent in Icelandic 
foreign policy, where the objective was to maintain US military presence on the 
island, but in the case of Iceland and its participation in CSDP operations, this 
motivation does not seem to be especially applicable. 
 
Motives linked to new institutional frameworks for military intervention 
Here, the most obvious possible reasoning is linked to the utility of the given 
institution taking on the task in question. NATO might sometimes be viewed as 
the sole good option for intervention due to its “professional military capabilities 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 Iceland ended up running against Austria and Turkey for the two seats in the Security Council allotted to the 
WEOG Group (Western European and Others Group). On election day, in October 2008, both Austria and 
Turkey got the two thirds of the votes required to secure a seat in the first round of voting. Therefore, Iceland did 
not get a seat in the Security Council (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009b). 
  41 
and ʻtoughnessʼ”, or the EU because of its capacity to coordinate multi-functional 
inputs, such as police and humanitarian contingents, aid and other economic 
resources (Bailes 2008, p. 81). Furthermore, the EU might sometimes be in a 
unique position to carry on a process following a crisis in the Balkans or the 
Western part of the former Soviet Union, perhaps unlike the UN or the OSCE. 
The EU can encourage and support the general transformation of affected states to 
the point of opening a window of them being considered for joining the Union – a 
carrot that has been craved by many states since the end of the Cold War. 
However, looking at the case of Iceland and the CSDP, this motivation has very 
limited, if any, explanatory power. 
 
Strategic economic motives 
Bailes highlights that this sort of motivation has surely been overrated in popular 
conspiracy theories which claim that every Western intervention in the Middle 
East, and even in countries like Sudan, has been grounded on oil. Even though 
considerations to do with oil have been prominent in US thinking throughout 
modern times, both on general strategy as well as specific actions, Bailes 
considers it unlikely that any group of Europeans would contemplate ʻsaving oilʼ 
as a sufficient reason on its own, to push for military action overseas (Bailes 2008, 
p. 82). Nevertheless, looking at Iceland’s participation in CSDP operations, this 
motivation does not seem to have been a reason for CSDP participation. 
5.3 Altruistic Motivations 
As elaborated on in chapter two, this kind of motive is considered the opposite of 
something characterized by pure self-interest. It is detached from traditional 
rational and realist notions and involves political decision-makers and states 
initiating actions that will not benefit themselves personally nor the nation at 
large. Of course, it is difficult to assess to what extent proclaimed altruistic 
motivations have driven decision-makers to participate in operations overseas. Do 
altruistic motivations have real explanatory power or are they perhaps really a 
Trojan horse of sorts – a well sounding cover for the states’ real motivations? In 
any case, the Icelandic government has stressed that the country’s participation in 
international crisis management efforts is important and is looked upon as a big 
part in Iceland’s contribution to international cooperation. “The Crisis Response 
Unit is to a very large extent, part of Iceland’s development assistance. It is 
viewed as Iceland’s duty as a prosperous nation to participate and contribute to 
peacebuilding efforts in the world” (Iceland Crisis Response Unit 2007, p. 4). 
Prime minister Haarde (2006-2009), argued that while Iceland had previously 
been criticized for non-participation in international crisis management efforts, 
both internal and external conditions had changed after the Cold War – 
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sociological and economical. “Now, Iceland has moral and political obligations to 
publically voice the values the nation had agreed upon” (Haarde 2007). 
 
In the case of Iceland, the ICRU is part of the country’s development 
assistance. Iceland states it is committed to the UN target where developed 
countries have pledged to allocate 0,7% of their gross national income (GNI) to 
official development assistance (ODA). Countries’ proximity to the target and 
their commitment to achieve it is widely regarded by the international community 
as being an indicator of the generosity of individual countries’ aid policy. 
However, Iceland has been far away from reaching this target, with the percentage 
rocking between 0,09 in 1999, 0,37 in 2008, and down to 0,22 in 2012 (Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2006 and 2013e). If one were to use the UN 0,7% target as an 
indicator of altruism, Iceland would not score high. 
 
Advance of globalization and a more multipolar world 
The world has transformed greatly over the last quarter of a century. It is a world 
considered more multipolar, compared to the bipolar world of the Cold War era. 
People’s perception of armed conflict has changed and our understanding of 
armed conflict dynamics is more complex. It accentuates the way that fighting in 
faraway regions can drive transnational dangers such as terrorism and 
proliferation, but even a wide spread of drugs, human trafficking and disease. “If 
looked at from this perspective, altruistic interventions can probably be seen as 
less purely altruistic, but more rewarding in most cases today. Here, states may act 
on the basis of self-interest, at least in indirect terms” (Bailes 2008, p. 83).  
 
In 2004, Ásgrímsson stated very clearly that Icelandic contributions to 
international crisis management efforts had an altruistic dimension. “In recent 
years, the concept of security has become more extensive in scope than before and 
it is clear that there is causality between matters of security, human rights, 
development, resources and environment to name a few. Tangible contributions or 
deployments by Iceland in the field of conflict and crisis, can lead to local or 
regional security, respect for human rights, economic and social development and 
a sustainable utilization of natural resources. […] There are selfless motives 
behind the Icelandic government’s focus on the aforementioned matters” 
(Ásgrímsson 2004). 
 
Popular concern and demand for humanitarian action 
Demands that prosperous states can and should aid in especially difficult regions 
are frequently heard. Sometimes ʻthe publicʼ reasons that certain states should act 
as they have ʻclean handsʼ and can rather be accepted in the conflict region, where 
neighbors and larger powers with suspect motives would not be well received. 
Another scenario would be a reasoning which applies in states that have increased 
their exposure in more self-interested interventions and want to show its citizens 
and the world that they are still very much capable and concerned with doing 
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something good for mankind (Bailes 2008, p. 83). This idea can be transferred to 
the institutional level when European states support the odd humanitarian action 
by NATO – such as following the earthquake in the Kashmir region in 2005 – or 
when EU member states readily agreed to add disarmament and humanitarian 
tasks to the list of generic CSDP operations (Bailes 2008, p. 83). 
 
Iceland is fully aware of its limitations as a small state with no armed forces. 
However, looking at the public debate on Iceland’s role in the field of crisis 
management is interesting. Baldvinsson (2008) has researched the public 
discourse in Iceland on the country’s relationship with international crisis 
management efforts and concludes that Icelandic participation has generally been 
viewed positively in Icelandic public debate, and up until 2002 there was a 
parliamentary consensus on bolstering the ICRU and Icelandic peacekeeping 
participation (Baldvinsson 2008, p. 157). In 2002, some concerns were raised in 
parliament, but they were directed more at plans of Iceland increasing its activity 
in and subsequently secure its status within NATO, not the policy itself and 
functioning of the ICRU (ibid). 
 
An incident in Kabul in 2004 turned out to be a watershed moment in the 
public debate concerning Iceland and its crisis management activities. Pictures of 
Icelandic peacekeepers bearing arms at the Kabul Airport made the news in 
Iceland and stirred up heated debates in parliament and the media. It was also 
reported that the peacekeepers were granted military status and wore military 
uniforms (Bailes and Þórhallsson 2006, p. 337). Members of parliament criticized 
that the ICRU was beginning to move into the sphere of military activities and 
thereby going against the Icelanders’ fundamental non-military policy. Adding to 
that, some Icelandic peacekeepers got injured in a bomb attack in downtown 
Kabul, which greatly intensified the debate. Here, the Icelanders’ national identity 
came into play and was much debated. In 2006, Iceland got a new foreign minister 
– Valgerður Sverrisdóttir – which put great emphasis on ʻsofteningʼ the image of 
the ICRU. She implemented a different approach to Icelandic peacekeeping – 
choosing operations free of military elements and seeking to increase female 
participation in the ICRU (Sverrisdóttir 2007, Vísir 2006). Following this policy 
shift and the plummeting of funds for the ICRU after the banking collapse, public 
debate on Iceland and crisis management participation has settled and not been 
dominant if speeches in parliament and Internet media coverage on the issue are 
used as indicators (Alþingi.is and Icelandic Internet media). 
 
Demonstration of vigilance and strength 
This particular motivation for initiating and participating in operations overseas 
revolves around sending a message to other actors. Bailes (2008) states that it 
might be argued that particular genuinely humanitarian tasks, such as the 
provision of aid after devastating hurricanes in the Caribbean, might 
simultaneously send messages to Cuba or “other possible regional mischief-
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makers” that the West could and might also intervene in a more strategically 
protective mode. Another example could be the West’s involvement in UN 
actions in Lebanon, which were possibly meant to send concealed signals to Syria 
or Iran (Bailes 2008, p. 83-84). This motivation, as elaborated in Bailes’ typology, 
does not apply to the case of Iceland. With no army and limited resources, Iceland 
is in no position to demonstrate vigilance or strength by participating in crisis 
management operations. 
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6 Conclusions and Discussion 
The motivations for states participating in international crisis management 
operations vary between individual states and can partly depend on their 
individual strengths and geopolitical and security agenda. Contributions of non-
EU members to CSDP operations is an interesting development in international 
security politics in itself, but the fact that a nation without armed forces has 
chosen to do the same is especially intriguing. This thesis aimed to map Icelandʼs 
participation in CSDP operations and trace and seek explanations why this island 
nation, which has opted not to establish armed forces, would even choose to 
contribute to these operations. This has been done by answering the research 
question: Why would Iceland – a non-EU member state with no armed forces – 
choose to participate in CSDP operations? 
 
Iceland has taken part in international crisis management operations under the 
auspices of international organizations such as NATO, the UN, and the EU. 
International crisis management has become a very multidimensional activity, 
serving a number of different purposes. The motives behind such operations are 
rarely based on pure humanitarian considerations, but rather safeguarding interests 
connected to changed attitudes towards Western security. Looking at the case of 
Iceland, it seems their participation in such operations primarily stem from 
securing its status or interests within the international organizations or institutions 
it is a member of or is otherwise very reliant on. Concerning security and defence 
specifically, Iceland’s NATO membership is undoubtedly the most important in 
this regard. It seems that pure security interests has been the main explanation for 
which international crisis management operations Iceland has chosen to 
participate in. In light of this, the launch of the ICRU and international crisis 
management participation should not primarily be seen as a contribution to 
international humanitarian efforts, but most importantly as a contribution to 
Iceland’s own security and defence. Moreover, Iceland’s contributions can be 
viewed as an extraterritorial means to compensate for the lack of territorial 
defence. 
 
Historically, Iceland’s security has coincided with the security of Europe and 
as a NATO member, the country is currently bound by mutual defence 
commitments with 22 of the EU member states. Ever since the end of World War 
II and throughout Iceland’s history as an independent state, its defence policy has 
almost entirely relied on policy-making within the US administration and NATO. 
As a member of NATO, Iceland has always been part of the decision-making of 
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the security of Europe. This changed following the EU treading steadily into the 
sphere of foreign and security policy and with the launch of the CSDP. Now, 
Iceland does not have the same possibilities of getting involved in the dialogue on 
European security issues and the preparations of Petersberg tasks – the military 
and security priorities incorporated within the CSDP – as despite the country 
being a member of NATO, it is not a member of the EU. With the respective 
launches of the CFSP and the CSDP, and also the first looming and then actual 
departure of the US military base in Keflavík, Iceland was forced to put its foreign 
and security policy in a much wider Nordic and European context than before. 
Uncertainty and a feeling of possible marginalization seem to have had an effect 
in Iceland deciding to participate in two early CSDP operations – in FYROM and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina – which remain the only CSDP operations the country 
has contributed to. Also, there may have been a possibility of the reason being to 
make an early and symbolic stand – showing that the CSDP was something 
Iceland supported and intended to partake in. Overall, however, the Icelandic 
political elite does not seem to have had high ambitions in trying to try to affect 
the shaping of Europe’s new security environment, unlike Norway for example. 
So far, Iceland has not seen any reason to get under the wing of the EU 
concerning security and defence, as they have generally considered the 1951 
Defence Agreement and NATO membership (and the Keflavík US military base 
during its existence) pillars enough to protect the country’s security. Being a part 
of the CFSP and the CSDP has not been considered as a feasible option, as the 
political elite have generally not deemed EU membership to give any added value, 
beyond past and current security arrangements. 
 
Even though security interests seem to have been the main driver behind 
Iceland’s increased participation in international crisis management efforts – 
including CSDP operations – other national motivations also seem to have laid 
behind it. With no armed forces, Iceland looks at this sort of international 
cooperation as a means to train Icelandic nationals, create a knowledge base and 
acquire inside knowledge – something which will be useful in the future and 
regarded as an investment in Iceland’s own security. Although not openly stated, 
territorial security concerns may very well also been a motivation for Iceland’s 
participation. Despite being a faraway island state in the middle of the North 
Atlantic, Iceland is not immune to possible consequences of crisis situations in 
and around the borders of Europe. In 2001, Iceland became a part of the Schengen 
area – the area now comprising of 26 European states that have abolished passport 
or any other type of border control in-between their common border. Icelandic 
support of CSDP operations in the proximity of the Schengen border might partly 
be explained by fears of migrations flows, disruption of trade supplies and other 
potential repercussions of crisis situations close to the Schengen border. Looking 
at the CSDP operations Iceland has chosen to participate in – or intended to 
participate in – we see that they are clustered in the Balkans, meaning the very 
vicinity of the Schengen area, not, say, in Africa or even further afield. 
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Strategic motivations also seem to have contributed to Iceland’s increased 
activity in international peacekeeping efforts. Contributions may have been 
provided in order to please the Union – an actor Iceland is economically very 
dependent on and may have been intended to increase the country’s status and 
influence therein. Moreover, Iceland’s decision to run for a seat in the UN 
Security Council cannot be overlooked, where the country was during a ten year 
period trying to secure as many votes as possible. In order to gain credibility and 
status and as international crisis management efforts are such an integral part of 
the Security Council daily work, Iceland’s was forced to step up its own game so 
to speak. Looking at the heading of altruistic motivations, which are often put 
forth as a reason for crisis management participation – including in the case of 
Iceland – the fact remains that, although officially stated, it is difficult to assess to 
what extent such motivations really lay behind contributions. 
 
This thesis partly aimed at contributing to the research and knowledge of why 
third states decide to partake in CSDP operations. Even though this type of 
partnership generally remains limited in scope and has consequently been given 
little visibility, it is an interesting aspect of the EUʼs relations with the outside 
world. As previously mentioned, these contributions can bolster legitimacy and 
provide responses to shortfalls within the EU structures and activities, but they 
can also be problematic for a number of different reasons. Still, plenty of states 
have chosen to contribute, although the motivations naturally vary. While national 
interests and a means of gaining influence within the Union seem to be the main 
motivations behind third state participation (Rieker 2008, Tardy 2014, Blockmans 
2010 and more), the same seems to apply to the case of Iceland, despite not 
having any armed forces which are usually regarded as an integral part of national 
security. Therefore, this thesis supports the view that these motivations primarily 
lay behind third state participation in CSDP operations. Of course, other 
motivations also partly explain Icelandʼs participation – some of which are 
universal, while others might only be applicable to that certain actor, at a certain 
time in history. 
 
Over the years, Iceland has put much emphasis on being perceived as a 
peaceful country and has tried to adjust its international crisis management 
participation in order not to jeopardize that image. Being a state with no 
traditional defence forces, Iceland is not likely to contribute with military 
expertise to CSDP operations. Instead, Iceland’s contributions have mostly been 
channeled through civilian operations, administered by the ICRU, a civilian 
peacekeeping unit which emphasizes social construction and economic 
development in its operations. Iceland’s participation seems to have been taken on 
a case-by-case basis. Ideally, a more long-term and more comprehensive strategy 
might be needed, a strategy that does not radically change every time a new 
minister enters the ministry, but is based on Iceland contributing with something 
useful to multilateral crisis management operations. Such an approach might 
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consolidate and strengthen Iceland’s negotiating position within international 
organizations. 
 
Looking to the future, a group working under the foreign minister handed in 
their recommendations concerning the development of a national security strategy 
in March 2014 where it stresses that Iceland should do everything in its power to 
contribute to the support of economic and social development by taking part in 
international development cooperation and civilian peacekeeping and 
humanitarian efforts (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2014c, p. 6). Iceland is a small 
state and there is a constant debate on how much such actors really matter and if 
they can make a real difference in the global arena. During the last few years, 
Iceland has had politicians aware of this. In 2007, prime minister Haarde warned 
that Iceland had to resist displaying “vainglorious arrogance” concerning the 
country’s position in the international community (Prime Minister’s Office 
2007b). Foreign minister Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir (2007-2009) seconded that 
and argued that an “appropriate mix of confidence, optimism and pragmatism 
[would be] most effective” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2007). 
 
The future of Iceland’s contributions to CSDP operations is subject to a 
number of factors – most of them political and financial. The composition of 
government and especially who fills the position of foreign minister is most likely 
to shape future developments. On paper, the policy of Iceland and the EU on crisis 
management coincide and the two should make ideal partners. In the national 
2009 Risk Assessment Report mentioned earlier, the group highlights that the EU 
has focused on member state cooperation in dealing with threats such as organized 
crime, epidemics, natural disasters, and terrorism and recommends that Iceland 
should strengthen its cooperation with the EU in these areas and others such as 
peacekeeping (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009b, p. 25). However, national 
politics come into play and we have a nation divided in its attitude towards the EU 
and potential Icelandic EU membership. Following the 2013 election, a very 
Euro-sceptical government came into power, dissolving the EU accession team 
and suspending negotiations. Moreover, in March 2014, the foreign minister 
presented the government’s new European policy, where no mention is given to 
CSDP operations or Icelandic contributions to such operations (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 2014d). Another factor that will influence the possibility of 
Iceland contributing to future CSDP operations is the development of how Iceland 
will recover from the effects of the 2008 banking collapse, the repercussions of 
which are still being dealt with. The ICRU has been subject to relatively huge 
budget cuts since ʻthe Crashʼ and not much seems to suggest that anything other 
than NATO operations will continue to take precedence as the recovery continues 
and the potential willingness to devote more financial resources to the ICRU and 
its activities increases. However, as participation in international operations can 
have adverse effects, Iceland must periodically assess the security implications of 
political ties with the countries and organizations they work with and regularly 
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reassess its national security needs in view of the rapid changes in the global 
security environment. 
 
Although Iceland has participated in two CSDP operations to date, it cannot be 
ignored that the contributions have been very limited in scope – even for Icelandic 
standards. Iceland is currently not contributing to any CSDP operation and 
political and financial provisions make it uncertain when it will next time occur. 
Iceland’s somewhat hesitant approach towards the EU – highlighted by the 
limited participation in CSDP operations and applying for full EU membership in 
2009 and then suspending accession talks in 2013 – illustrates a small state 
uncertain of its place in the world, still finding its feet following the end of the 
Cold War and in a world transformed. 
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